The UN's Global Compact on Refugees under the Biden Administration

The Global Compact on Refugees, adopted in December 2018 by the United Nations General Assembly through Resolution 73/151, aims to create a comprehensive framework for simultaneously addressing refugee situations and tackling the root causes of displacement. In observance of the fourth anniversary of Resolution 73/151, UN Member States and other stakeholders convened in Geneva in December 2023 for the second Global Refugee Forum (GRF). This forum serves as a platform for declaring specific pledges and contributions, showcasing advancements, and exchanging successful approaches to refugee challenges.^[4] These efforts align with the GCR’s four objectives: easing pressures on host countries, enhancing refugee self-reliance, increasing access to third-country solutions, and improving conditions in countries of origin.

Despite pledging immediately following the first GRF in December 2019, the US, along with Hungary, voted against Resolution 73/151. During the negotiations, the US delegation expressed concerns about the incompatibility of the draft resolution with its national legislation and national security priorities.^[5]

This article presents an analysis of the US’s impact on the compact in relation to the GCR Indicator Framework, focusing specifically on refugee admissions and resettlement, and other pathways for humanitarian protection. This evaluation draws on data from intergovernmental organizations, US federal agencies, and an analysis of government policies and programs.

Analyzing the US’s role is crucial given the country’s historical importance in establishing the International Refugee Protection Regime a hundred years ago. The US has not only contributed to providing durable solutions for refugees but has also set an example for other countries to join the regime's efforts. An  active US contribution within the regime remains essential for alleviating pressures on host countries and accessing third-country solutions.

Since the adoption of the GCR, the US government has made 39 commitments—three under the Trump administration and 36 under the Biden administration. These commitments address various areas, including reducing statelessness, improving protection for LGBTQI+ refugees, increasing resettlement and protection pathways, and establishing new referral and public-private sponsorships for refugees, among others. Out of the 39 pledges, the US has fulfilled 38 percent.

Beyond these pledges, progress toward the fulfillment of the GCR’s objectives is also measured through 16 indicators,^[6] which seek to support periodic review and strengthen the availability of global data. These indicators include aspects of burden sharing, resettlement, refugee living conditions, and durable solutions.

Upon taking office in early 2021, President Biden aimed to rejuvenate the country's commitment to the refugee protection regime. He pledged to reinstate a multilateral approach to humanitarian affairs and address deficiencies in migration policy, in line with GCR priorities. Near the end of his administration, President Biden has been unable to reach the established admission ceilings, resolve the crisis of asylum seekers at the border, or eradicate the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs). In contrast to previous procedures, MPPs require asylum seekers to remain in Mexico while awaiting their immigration hearing. While President Biden did end Title 42^[7] in May 2023, the US continues to fall short of its international obligations to the principles of 'non-refoulement' and 'non-removal.' However, compared to his predecessor, he has lifted the refugee ban based on national origin, and refugee admissions and affirmative asylum resolutions have increased.

One of the Biden administration’s first moves on refugee resettlement was Executive Order #141013, issued in February 2021. This order aimed to enhance the US Refugee Admissions Program's (USRAP) capabilities, solicit new forms of sponsorship, increase resettlement, and expand complementary protection pathways. However, the order was introduced ten months prior to the submission of the new administration's first pledges. This suggests the administration may have labeled existing initiatives as GCR-related efforts.

USRAP is responsible for receiving refugees referred by the UNHCR and/or by US diplomatic representations, providing them with basic services for up to 90 days after their arrival. Under the powers conferred by the Refugee Act of 1980, each year, the president proposes to Congress a limit on the number of refugee admissions in a given fiscal year (FY).

For his last FY, President Trump set the refugee admissions cap at 15,000, the lowest number ever established. Despite President Biden's early announcement that he would maintain the limit set by his predecessor, in February 2021, he raised the ceiling to 62,500 in response to mounting public pressure. However, only 11,411 refugees were admitted and resettled in FY 2021, marking the lowest number in USRAP history.

The Biden administration set the admission ceiling at 125,000 refugees for FY 2022 and FY 2023, the highest proposed ceiling to date. However, only 20 percent was achieved in FY 2022 due to various administrative and strategic reasons. These include the dismantling of part of the USRAP relocation program under President Trump, the permanent closure of several offices, and the temporary suspension of the Refugee Program due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, FY 2023 saw an increase, with almost 48 percent of the ceiling being met.^[8]

Indicator 3.1.1 of the GCR Indicator Framework measures the number of refugees who, having been referred by the UNHCR for resettlement, leave their country of asylum for the country of resettlement. While a country's laws may allow for the resettlement of refugees referred by various entities such as the US, indicator 3.1.1 only considers refugees referred by the UNHCR.

In 2016, the last year of the Obama administration, the US resettled 72 percent of 108,197 refugees referred by the High Commissioner. One year later, in the first year of the Trump administration, the US resettled 24,599 refugees referred by the UNHCR, representing almost 92 percent. The lowest number of refugee resettlements in the last eight years was in 2020, under the Biden administration, with 6,740 refugees. However, this number was three times greater than the total number of referrals that year.

During the Biden administration, the number of refugees resettled from UNHCR referrals were low both in net terms and as a proportion. In 2021, only 35 percent of referred refugees were resettled, and this declined to 27 percent in 2022. While the total number of refugee admissions in 2022 was higher than in 2020 and 2021 combined, it was still lower than in 2002 and 2003, when admissions were frozen due to the post-9/11 federal reorganization process. In contrast, refugee admissions from UNHCR referrals increased significantly in 2023, with 61,644 out of 105,490 being resettled, representing 58 percent.^[9] 

Despite the low numbers in the initial years of the GCR's implementation, between 2018 and 2023, one in three refugees were resettled in the US, continuing to position the country as the leading nation in resettlement. In fact, the US has historically resettled the most refugees referred by UNHCR since 1980.

Indicator 3.2.1 of the GCR refers to the number of refugees admitted through complementary pathways, from the country of asylum to a third country. These pathways are safe and regulated, providing legal access and residence in a third country where international protection needs are met. Based on the provisions of Title 8, Chapter 12 of the US Code, in addition to the refugee program, the US has complementary admission pathways, including the asylum system and "other forms of humanitarian protection."

An asylee is  defined as "a person who meets the definition of a refugee but who is already present in United States territory or seeks admission from a port of entry"^[10] and who requests protection under the same fear criteria for persecution. President Trump's administration undermined the longstanding American tradition of providing asylum through various measures, including the detention and removal of applicants, the prohibition of eligibility for those coming from transit countries, the imposition of limits on the number of people who can present themselves at the border to request asylum,^[11] bilateral agreements with sending countries, and the MPPs. These measures reduced the possibilities of finding protection in the US for many vulnerable groups, practically dismantling the asylum system.

One of President Biden's first actions to restore the asylum system was to rescind the MPPs. However, he was forced to reinstate the program following a court order in late 2021. Additionally, the Biden administration maintained Title 42 of Section 265 of the US Code until May 2023. This measure, invoked by the previous administration, allows the suspension of entry for people and imports from designated places to prevent the spread of communicable diseases.

Despite several memorandums aimed at resolving the backlog  of asylum applications caused by the dismantling of the system under President Trump, over 1 million applicants were still awaiting decisions by the end of FY 2023.^[12] Most of these individuals were waiting in places where their lives might remain in danger, such as Mexico.

The category of "other forms of humanitarian protection" includes Temporary Protected Status (TPS) through which temporary residence is granted to foreigners whose return to their country of origin may pose a threat to their physical and/or mental integrity due to armed conflicts and other extraordinary situations, such as natural disasters.^[13] TPS beneficiaries are not subject to detention or expulsion based on immigration status, in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention. Currently, nationals of 16 countries are eligible for this program. As of September 2024, according to the latest official report, 863,880 people benefited from TPS,^[14] with the majority being nationals from El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, and Venezuela.

Additional complementary admission routes include Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) and Humanitarian Parole. DED allows for the suspension of expulsion, at the discretion of the President, of aliens whose return to their countries of origin may place them in imminent danger. Currently, Liberia (designated in June 2007), Hong Kong (August 2021), the Palestinian territories (February 2024), and Lebanon (July 2024) are the only countries or territories whose nationals can benefit from DED.

Meanwhile, Humanitarian Parole "allows an individual, who may be inadmissible or otherwise ineligible for admission into the United States, to be paroled [...] for a temporary period,"^[15] at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security. While there are no nationality restrictions, Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Venezuelans, and, more recently, Palestinians and Ukrainians, are among the nationalities that benefit the most. In  FY 2023, more than 1.3 million individuals arrived on US soil.^[16] In this regard, Humanitarian Parole has been one of the enduring features of the Biden administration.

Other forms of humanitarian aid recognized by US law include temporary immigration for victims of human trafficking and other criminal acts, as well as victims of female genital mutilation and forced marriage. In addition, "special immigrant visas" (SIV) have been granted to thousands of Afghans since the Taliban takeover in August 2021.

The evidence presented in this article reaffirms the US’s crucial role in achieving the objectives of the GCR, despite domestic challenges. It also highlights the incongruencies between foreign policy on humanitarian affairs and domestic policy on refugees and asylum. With the 2024 presidential election on the horizon, it remains to be seen whether the Biden administration’s approach to forced displacement and the country's role in the GCR will continue.

 

Mary Carmen Peloche Barrera is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science & International Relations at Tecnológico de Monterrey’s School of Social Sciences and Government. She has published four book chapters and presented at both national and international conferences. Her research focuses on U.S. and Canadian politics, U.S. migration policy, and the International Refugee Protection Regime.

---

[1] “Resettlement Data Finder”, UNHCR, accessed October 2, 2024. https://rsq.unhcr.org

[2] “Refugee Processing Center”, U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, accessed October 2, 2024. https://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/ 

[3] “Humanitarian”, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services”, accessed October 2, 2024. https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian 

[4] “Global Refugee Forum 2023”. UNHCR, accessed October 1, 2024. https://www.unhcr.org/global-refugee-forum-2023

[5] “Explanation of Vote in a Meeting of the Third Committee on a UNHCR Omnibus Resolution”, United States Mission to the United Nations, accessed October 2, 2024. https://usun.usmission.gov/explanation-of-vote-in-a-meeting-of-the-third-committee-on-a-unhcr-omnibus-resolution/

[6] “Global Compact on Refugees Indicator Framework”. UNHCR, accessed October 1, 2024. https://www.unhcr.org/fr-fr/en/media/global-compact-refugees-indicator-framework-2022

[7] Title 42, Section 265 of the United States Code allows for the “suspension of entries and imports from designated places to prevent spread of communicable diseases” (42 U.S.C. § 265.)

[8] “Refugee Admissions Report”, Refugee Processing Center, U.S. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, accessed October 3, 2024. https://www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/ 

[9] “Resettlement Data Finder”, UNHCR, accessed October 3, 2024. https://rsq.unhcr.org/en/#d6Lb

[10] 8 U.S.C. § 1158.

[11] “USCIS Faces Challenges Meeting Statutory Timelines and Reducing Its Backlog of Affirmative Asylum Claims”. Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. July 2024, accessed October 3, 2024. https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2024-07/OIG-24-36-Jul24.pdf  

[12] Christi, Muzaffar; Meissner, Doris; Yale-Loehr, Stephen; Bush-Joseph, Kathleen; and Levesque, Christopher. “At the Braking Point: Rethinking the U.S. Immigration Court System”. Migration Policy Institute. July 2023, accessed October 1, 2024. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-immigration-courts

[13] 8 U.S.C. § 1254a.

[14] “Temporary Protected Status and Deferred Enforced Departure”. Congressional Research Service, accessed October 2, 2024. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/RS20844.pdf

[15] 8. U.S.C. § 1182 (d)(5).

[16] “Parole Requests, Fiscal Year 2023, Fourth Quarter”, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. April 2024, accessed October 3, 2024. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-07/2024_0403_dmo_plcy_parole_requests_q4.pdf