A cursory internet search for the term “proxy war” yields a trove of generic articles that either overcomplicate the concept with academic jargon or obscure it with excessive details about obscure conflicts. A casual perusal of any online bookstore presents a similar problem: the concept of a proxy war tends to inspire thick anthologies of academic writing or polemical monographs whose chief appeal lies in their proximity to current affairs, in addition to the occasional conspiratorial pamphlet or self-published historical fiction set in a war zone. Thus, Proxy Wars from a Global Perspective, edited by Pawel Bernat, Cüneyt Gürer, and Cyprian Alexander Kozera, fills a critical need. These scholars combiner academic rigor, regional expertise, and practical field experience to offer a paradigm that bridges the gap between theory and practice.
Proxy Wars utilizes ten case studies to define its titular concept, each of which captures some aspect of the concept’s broader import. These case studies are framed by a thorough introduction that lays out a fresh paradigm for studying proxy wars and a conclusion that applies this paradigm to the art of predicting the configuration of alliances on the world stage. The conclusion alone is worth the price of the book as it takes the reader on a tour of potential applications of this paradigm, from transnational organized crime to digital privateerism to chokepoints in global economic networks. Moreover, the volume contains something for every reader, with case studies ranging from Russia’s war on Ukraine to insurgencies spreading across the African continent, and time-worn yet evergreen conflicts in the Middle East, including Yemen, Palestine, and Syria.
By opening the volume to contributors from a range of fields and areas of expertise, the editors elevate the study of proxy wars beyond abstract, academic theorizing. As proxy groups dominate headlines – from the Houthis in Yemen to the Wagner Group in Ukraine and Africa – this study from Bloomsbury Press arrives at a critical moment for policymakers. The book lays out a convincing case that the proxy wars of the 21st century have outgrown the theoretical and political tools developed for 20th century proxy wars, and thus demand a total reexamination, if not a rediscovery. This volume not only undertakes a convincing modernization of the treatment of proxy wars as a subject worthy of academic attention but also balances out the fashionable focus on “great power competition” with a new term, “great power survival.” The former term describes a paradigm of strategic rivalry within the international system whereas the latter embraces various disparate efforts by states to preserve their sovereignty, territorial integrity, or regime. The editors highlight that a state’s perception of the stakes in the international order determines whether it approaches affairs in terms of relative advantages or existential threats. As a result, Proxy Wars functions like a camera with many lenses to capture the essence of proxy wars across a variety of conflicts and contexts.
As the editors note, “Current proxy conflicts are simply much more complex and interlinked than before” (16). To address this complexity, they introduce the principal-agent framework, highlighting the perennial divergence of interests between states– traditionally the principals – and their proxies, or agents, , which leads to inefficiencies and unintended consequences. The principal-agent problem compounds the complexity that arises from increasing globalization, geopolitical restructuring, the weaponization of finance, and interconnected supply chains, all of which fuel transnational social movements, armed non-state actors, and “conflict entrepreneurs.” Consequently, the changes taking place within the international system mean that states are no longer the only possible sponsors of parties engaged in proxy warfare; indeed, such sponsors can now include multinational corporations, private military companies, and transnational criminal organizations. While the volume explores how states proxify the political, social, and economic institutions over which they have authority to advance their agendas, it has the discipline to maintain a focused analysis on specific conflicts without theorizing too much about the nature of power in the modern world.
The Nixon Doctrine takes center stage in Proxy Wars, as it was the thirty-seventh U.S. president who first grasped the potential of deploying American military advisors abroad instead of entire armies to protect American interests. Every president since Nixon has upheld this doctrine and thereby set an example for other states to follow. Chapter 2 examines how Cold War parameters established an informal rulebook for proxy warfare and empowered the US and USSR to keep conflicts from escalating past mutually-recognized ceilings, understood as the levels past which the threat of thermonuclear war becomes more likely. Today, those rules have changed in tandem with the international order, which is defined less by superpower rivalry in a bipolar world and more by shifting alliances in a G-Zero, or anarchic, order. Though the Russo-Chinese partnership comes up frequently, the editors take care to note that China has a vested interest in upholding the US-led international order from which it has benefited greatly while Russia seeks to demolish it lest it find itself marginalized from this same order. In other words, as in the 20th century, Russia and China are at odds, but this time they occupy divergent positions: China’s rise has resulted from its successful integration into the current order whereas Russia sees itself as a victim of this order and looks to partner with other self-styled victims, such as Iran and North Korea. This dynamic constrains Russo-Chinese cooperation in opposing the interests of the United States, which hovers over the case studies in this book like a specter of strategic inevitability, at once shaping alignments and provoking resistance.
The authors may be criticized for two reasons. First, the volume could have benefited from more careful editing to eliminate typographical errors and streamline grammatical constructions. Second, through no fault of the editors and contributors, the world has changed in many ways since this book went to print. Indeed, no one could have foreseen how Israel would shatter the Shiite Crescent in its wars on Hamas and Hezbollah, or how Abu Mohammad al-Julani would lead an upstart group of revolutionaries to topple Bashar al-Assad in the span of eleven days, setting off a realignment in Syria. Moreover, the war in Ukraine has resulted in neither the defeat nor collapse of Russia, as many had expected. Instead, it has deepened ties between the states of the so-called Axis of Resistance while exposing the fault-lines in NATO, as discussed in Chapter 4.
Nonetheless, these rapid geopolitical shifts confirm the importance of the volume, which the editors themselves see as an important step in bridging the gap between the subject’s importance and its actual study. They cite a host of studies that describe proxy warfare as “chronically under-analyzed,” “under-theorized,” “under-researched,”and “understudied.” This neglect, they argue, derives from the fact that “the term has become too ambiguous and, in consequence, has lost much of its explanatory power” (11). As both editors and contributors point out, proxy warfare has not received much systematic treatment because practitioners focus on case studies that scholars neglect to integrate into the overarching theories of international relations.
Beyond documenting the emergence and persistence of proxy wars, this volume invites readers to ask larger questions that might open up new fields of inquiry within the fields of international relations and war studies. For example, through the lens of cyber conflicts, the editors consider whether new and qualitatively unique forms of proxy wars have emerged in the 21st century.. The volume notes that Russia has used cyberattacks as part of its toolkit for hybrid warfare since its 2014 annexation of Crimea, while raising important questions on whether state-sponsored hacking groups force policy practitioners to reconsider the practical and ethical questions around proxy wars. Furthermore, Chapter 14, “Transnational Organized Crime Groups as State Proxies,” presents transnational organized crime as a valuable tool in the hands of authoritarian regimes, drawing a historical parallel to the use of privateers by powers opposed to the Spanish and Portuguese empires of the New World. That chapter might have gone further in applying the concept to modern cyber conflicts, in which organized ransomware groups play a growing role, often with the tacit approval, if not outright support, of authoritarian regimes such as Iran, Russia, and China, but that would require a tome of its own.
In conclusion, Proxy Wars is essential reading for scholars, practitioners, and armchair enthusiasts alike. The book’s organization caters to diverse needs, enabling both focused exploration of specific conflicts and a broader theoretical analysis. Regardless of the reader’s approach, this volume makes for a useful vade mecum for anyone seeking to navigate the shifting landscape of international security.
Staff Writer: Anthony J. Tokarz is a geoeconomist with experience in defense tech, banking, and political consulting. He studied International Finance and Cybersecurity at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and Eurasian Security at the Harriman Institute. His analyses of NATO procurement challenges and security in Europe and Africa have appeared in several publications, including The National Interest, EurasiaNet, and Responsible Statecraft, among others.
