From Hegemony to Fragmentation: The MAGA Doctrine and the Future of Global Order

The “Make America Great Again” doctrine is more than a shift in U.S. foreign policy. By replacing institutional leadership with transactional engagement, it accelerates the erosion of the post-war liberal order and pushes the world toward a fragmented, less predictable multi-polarity.

By
Muhammad Iqbal Uddin Arif and Dennis Jjuuko
November 20, 2026

The rise and decline of great powers is a persistent feature of international politics. For much of the post-World War II era, the United States has occupied a central position, first within a bipolar system and, after the Cold War, as the anchor of a unipolar order. In this role, it helped construct and sustain a liberal international architecture grounded in cooperation, open markets, international law, and institutional legitimacy. This system enabled the provision of global public goods, including security guarantees, economic stability, and a rules-based order.     

Today, however, that order faces mounting strain as the Make America Great Again (MAGA) doctrine, closely associated with Donald Trump, increasingly shapes U.S. foreign policy. The MAGA doctrine is defined by economic nationalism, skepticism toward multilateral institutions, and a transactional approach to diplomacy. While MAGA emerged as a domestic political project, its principles have increasingly been translated into foreign-policy practice, giving it significance as an emerging doctrine of international relations. Under the second Trump administration, this approach challenges core assumptions of the post-Cold War order. Resultantly, the issue is no longer simply whether U.S. policy is changing, but whether the foundations of global governance are being reconfigured.

This article makes three contributions. First, it connects domestic ideological transformation to systemic change by showing how MAGA translates into shifts in global order. Second, it advances debates on multipolarity by demonstrating that systemic transition is not only material but also normative. Third, it offers a policy-relevant framework for understanding how the erosion of hegemonic leadership can be mitigated through adaptive forms of multilateralism.

We address two central questions. Is U.S. global leadership declining as a result of MAGA policies? And how has this shift affected global governance structures? We argue that MAGA accelerates the erosion of hegemonic stability, weakens multilateral cooperation, and contributes to a transition toward a fragmented multipolar or non-polar system.  By prioritizing sovereignty and short-term national gains in foreign policy, the doctrine can weaken the cooperative norms necessary to manage transnational challenges in global governance, including climate change, global health, and collective security.

The analysis that follows draws on documentary and critical discourse analysis of U.S. policy documents, executive actions, and speeches since 2016, read alongside the wider scholarly and policy literature, with comparative reference to how China, Russia, the European Union, and actors in the Global South have responded.

Debating a Hegemon in Decline

Debates over the stability of unipolar versus multipolar systems remain unresolved in international relations. Realist perspectives emphasize the distribution of power, suggesting that the decline of a hegemon invites competition and instability. From this view, U.S. retrenchment creates strategic space for rival powers such as China and Russia, increasing the likelihood of geopolitical contestation.

Liberal institutionalists, conversely, stress the importance of institutions in sustaining cooperation. These institutions reduce transaction costs, enhance transparency, and reinforce credible commitments. MAGA's retreat from multilateral frameworks disrupts these mechanisms, weakening the institutional infrastructure that has historically supported cooperation on global challenges.

Constructivist approaches highlight the role of norms and shared identities. From this perspective, the liberal international order is not only material but also social. The erosion of multilateral norms under MAGA reflects a deeper disruption of collective expectations, encouraging fragmentation and competing identity-based alignments.

Taken together, these perspectives suggest that MAGA operates across three interconnected levels: material (redistribution of commitments), institutional (erosion of cooperation), and normative (fragmentation of shared rules). This framework guides the analysis that follows.

MAGA and the Retreat from Multilateralism

MAGA prioritizes national advantage over collective cooperation, reframing foreign policy as an extension of domestic political contestation. In practice, this has translated into a series of policy decisions that signal disengagement from multilateral commitments.

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, the World Health Organization, and the UN Human Rights Council, alongside reduced support for institutions such as the WTO and UNRWA, illustrates a broader pattern of institutional retrenchment. Additional measures, including sanctions on the International Criminal Court and proposals to scale back funding for NATO and other international bodies, further underscore this shift.

Military posture has also been affected, with reductions in troop deployments in Europe, reconsideration of strategic commitments, and the reallocation of defence resources reflecting a recalibration of U.S. global engagement. Similarly, cuts to development assistance and the dismantling of key soft-power instruments have weakened the United States’ normative influence.

These developments are not isolated policy choices but elements of a broader strategic reorientation. By replacing institutional leadership with more transactional engagement, MAGA shifts the United States away from its traditional role as a system-stabilizing actor. . The result is increased uncertainty, as long-standing commitments that once underpinned global stability become less reliable.

The Return to Multipolarity

The consequences of this shift extend beyond institutional weakening. In international politics, perceptions of reliability are as important as material capabilities. As U.S. commitments appear less consistent, allies adjust their strategies while rivals exploit emerging gaps.

This dynamic does not produce an orderly transition to multipolarity; rather it fosters fragmentation. Traditional alliances      strain      while new alignments emerge around alternative governance models, including authoritarian capitalism and state-led development. The growing prominence of institutions such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation reflects the emergence of alternative platforms that challenge aspects of the US-led liberal international order.

Rather than a clear redistribution of power, the emerging system tends toward partial multipolarity combined with elements of non-polarity, where no single actor exercises decisive authority. In this environment, transnational challenges — climate change, pandemics, cybersecurity, and nuclear proliferation — become harder to manage due to weakened coordination mechanisms.

Toward Adaptive Multilateralism

The MAGA doctrine represents more than a shift in U.S. foreign policy: it signals a broader transformation in the structure of global order. By prioritizing unilateralism and short-term national gains, it erodes the institutional and normative foundations of post-war multilateralism. The result is not simply the decline of U.S. leadership, but the emergence of a more fragmented and unstable international system.

The central task is not to restore unipolar dominance, but to adapt global governance to a more pluralistic environment. Three directions are particularly important: first, institutional resilience must be strengthened through reform rather than abandonment; second, coalition-based multilateralism, built around flexible, issue-specific partnerships, offers a pragmatic path forward; and third, rebuilding credibility requires greater consistency in foreign policy, reducing the impact of domestic political volatility on international commitments.

Ultimately, the future of global order will depend less on whether the United States leads alone and more on whether it can lead collaboratively. In an era defined by interdependence and uncertainty, effective leadership will require not dominance, but coordination.

 

Muhammad Iqbal Uddin Arif, PhD, is an Associate Lecturer at the Osher Lifelong Learning Institute, University of Massachusetts Boston, US, 100 Morrissey Blvd, Boston, MA 02125. [email protected]

Dennis Jjuuko, PhD, is an Associate Lecturer of Global Governance in the Department of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance, McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies, University of Massachusetts Boston, US, 100 Morrissey Blvd, Boston, MA 02125. [email protected]

The authors declare no conflicts of interest. This study draws entirely on publicly available secondary sources; no human subjects were involved.

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