Freedom of Expression without Freedom of the Press

One week after journalist Anna Politkovskaya was assassinated in Moscow, the Russian polling agency Levada Center asked her compatriots whether they had been aware of her work before the murder.1 Six percent said they had read her articles in which she investigated atrocities in Chechnya and other grim aspects of Russian life. Of this small group of readers, very few chose to join the rally the day after Politkovskaya’s death at the hands of a contract killer.2

President Vladimir Putin did not immediately make a public statement on the assassination of Politkovskaya, nor did he face questions about her death from Russian reporters. While Putin’s Kremlin had long ruled out “unfriendly” questioning of top figures in the Russian leadership by domestic media, Putin was forced to address the questionable circumstances surrounding Politkovskaya’s death a few days later when he traveled to Germany. Asked by a Süddeutsche Zeitung reporter, the Russian president noted that Anna’s “political influence…was insignificant inside the country and, chances are, she was more notable in human rights circles and in mass media circles in the West…. For current authorities in general and Chechen authorities in particular, Politkovskaya’s murder did more damage than her articles.”3 Putin’s German hostess, Chancellor Angela Merkel, may have connected Politkovskaya’s murder to problems of press freedom in Russia, but Putin would not. He was more concerned about the damage done to government authorities, not to freedoms.4

Cynicism is Putin’s signature style, but in this case his remarks were, sadly, correct. Politkovskaya was not broadly appreciated by her compatriots, nor was she a role model for young journalists. Her writings did not have much public impact. Outside of a limited constituency concerned about democratic norms and civil liberties, it did not occur to people to hold Putin, or the government in general, accountable for Politkovskaya’s death or for the blunt violations of human rights she chronicled, even indirectly. It is not that people are scared; rather, it appears that they do not care. Putin may be cynical, but so are the majority of Russians, and the most common reaction to reports of blatant abuse of government authority is “what else is new?”5

If the killing and harassment of journalists is the most obvious evidence of serious problems with press freedom in Russia, public indifference and cynicism aggravate the situation further. Another major constraint on media freedom is the Kremlin’s tight control over politics, policy making, and national television. In this environment, the existing independent media remain irrelevant as tools of public accountability.

Contract Killings in a Corrupt Environment

With an apathetic and atomized public, the Kremlin hardly needs to physically eliminate critical reporters who still try to expose the unsavory practices of government officials.6 It is still not known who killed Anna Politkovskaya, but the contractor of her assassination is not likely to be found in the Kremlin.

Freedom House has labeled Russia as “not free” since 2005, but this ranking may be misleading.7 It would be wrong to regard Russia as a hard authoritarian regime that, much like the USSR, persecutes its citizens for disseminating unwelcome information. While today’s Russia may in fact have some elements of a police state, it is mainly a deeply corrupt one in which power and property are closely entangled and the public institutions of law and order are gravely compromised.8 But if the Kremlin should not be held directly responsible for masterminding murders, it certainly bears responsibility for the atmosphere of lawlessness in which contracted assassinations are commonly practiced as a way to get rid of adversaries or competitors. Journalists encroaching on powerful interests are not the only victims; the same method has also been used to settle scores with rivals in business, banking, and occasionally in local politics.

In a system where clout and money easily override the law, contractors as well as the perpetrators of killings have a good chance of getting away with their crimes. When neither money nor clout are involved, the investigation’s incompetence may be a determining factor. In a deeply corrupt system, there is little incentive for honest professional effort and the quality of criminal probes is notoriously low.

Anna Politkovskaya had encroached on too many powerful interests, including the leadership of Chechnya and the federal forces: for years she reported that that the pro-Moscow Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov and people in his circle bore responsibility for abductions, torture, and other crimes; she also repeatedly exposed the atrocities of federal forces in the same territory. In 2001, Politkovskaya’s employer Novaya Gazeta published her piece “Disappearing people” in which she blamed the disappearance of Chechens on a special police team dispatched from Siberia.9 As a result, at least one of the policemen was sentenced to eleven years of imprisonment, while others in his team went into hiding.10 Clearly, Politkovskaya had made enemies.

Failed Trial

For a while the investigation into Politkovskaya’s assassination appeared to be making good progress. Then something strange happened. Approximately one year after her murder, Russian Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika announced at a news conference that ten people had been arrested in connection with the crime. Though he did not identify the names of the suspects, they were leaked to the press within a few days. Anna’s colleagues at Novaya Gazeta firmly believed that the leaks were damaging to the case because they prompted key perpetrators to go into hiding. “According to our sources,” the Novaya deputy editor wrote, “These leaks constituted a purposeful policy whose goal is the destruction of the case.”11 This helps explain why only a few minor suspects were tried when the case finally went to court. According to media reports, the alleged killer fled Russia soon after the prosecutor general’s news conference and the subsequent leak of the suspects’ names.12 He was charged at the trial in absentia. Overall, the case of the prosecution was so weak that all the suspects were acquitted.13 To this day, the killer and the mastermind of Politkovskaya’s assassination remain undisclosed and at large.14

There are no answers as to why the prosecutor general chose to make public sensitive information about the investigation, or how the suspected killer of Politkovskaya was able to flee the country one year after the investigation began. Nonetheless, the case sheds light on how perpetrators of high-profile crimes get away with impunity.

Unsolved Killings

Estimates differ regarding the number of Russian journalists assassinated in the past, but very few murder cases were properly investigated and even fewer ended with a conviction.15 The same is true of contract assassinations in business circles. The period between 2008-2009 was especially bad—in late 2008 Mikhail Beketov, the editor of a local newspaper in a small town near Moscow, was brutally beaten. In his newspaper, Beketov had made numerous allegations about wrongdoings by the local administration related to the environment and other issues. He had been attacked several times before and repeatedly received threats, but the 2008 attack was meant to kill him. Miraculously he survived, but the damage to his health was irreversible.16 In the case of Beketov, the crime remains unsolved even though the motives of the attempted murder seem clear.17

In January 2009, human rights lawyer Stanislav Markelov and freelance journalist Anastasia Baburova were killed in broad daylight after leaving a news conference in Moscow.18 In July 2009, Natalia Estemirova, a human rights activist who lived and worked in Chechnya and contributed to a number of publications, including Novaya Gazeta, was abducted early in the morning as she was leaving her home in the Chechen capital Grozny. She was found dead several hours later.19 None of these murders have been solved.

Chechnya is currently ruled by Moscow-appointed leader Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov governs with little regard for human rights, and Moscow mostly turns a blind eye as long as he maintains a level of stability and tempers Chechnya as a threat to Russia. For journalists and human rights activists, however, Chechnya has been an especially dangerous place. After so many deaths there is little wonder why Anna Politkovskaya is not a role model for young reporters; other journalists simply will not go to Chechnya. The risk is high and the reward small. It is assumed that the situation is hopeless and that Chechnya, like other parts of the North Caucasus, is a culturally alien territory that is, in some ways, not even part of Russia. Coverage of Chechnya or other regions of the North Caucasus therefore has become scant, and the public does not seem to miss it. The few websites that chronicle the developments in this territory, Caucasian Knot being the most prominent among them, do not attract sizable audiences.20

Freedom of Expression

One should not assume from the discussion above that journalism is dead in Russia. Russian media is alive, and a few outlets continue to do investigative reporting. Compared to the USSR, Russia allows a much wider freedom of expression. On the web (uncensored in Russia), in print media, on the radio, or on smaller-audience TV channels, one can find plenty of reports, opinion pieces, and blog posts criticizing government policies. Some journalists even expose abuses of office by high-ranking government officials. This group of media is collectively described in this article as liberal. This term is used here to imply adherence to professional and ethical standards of independent media, as well as to western democratic norms and principles.

High-quality print media are primarily found in Moscow, where a number of dailies and weeklies pursue varying degrees of editorial independence and are not controlled or driven by loyalty to the state. Newspapers include, among others, the above-mentioned Novaya Gazeta; Kommersant, Russia’s closest equivalent to a mainstream daily with a strong focus on business and economic coverage; and Vedomosti, a business daily published together with the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times. Several weekly newsmagazines, such as Russian Newsweek, also practice independent editorial policies. A number of political websites offer a combination of news, analysis, and opinion unconstrained by censorship or other modes of state control. Ekho Moskvy (Echo of Moscow), a highly interactive political news and talk radio with a loyal audience of several hundred thousand, broadcasts live and offers a broad diversity of opinions on the issues of the day. REN-TV, a channel with a relatively large audience, has a relatively independent voice, especially in comparison with mass-audience, state-controlled television.

In this media realm one can read reports of governmental corruption and mismanagement. For instance, numerous media reported that the rescue operation in the Beslan school, sieged by terrorists in the fall of 2004, was badly bungled; namely, that state officials would not rely on negotiations with the terrorists and that, in the end, they opted for the use of heavy weapons even though some of the hostages remained in the school building.21 Certain publications went so far as to suggest that officials behind the rescue operation were more concerned about liquidation of terrorists than about saving human lives and that the government was, therefore, responsible for the huge death toll. In another example, according to a series of articles in the New Times, large sums of money had been siphoned out of the country by high-ranking officials.22

Finally, several years ago, Vedomosti thoroughly detailed the government-orchestrated scheme involved in the eventual takeover of Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s major oil asset by a state company. According to the report, the scheme included unlawful financial operations.23 The prosecution of Khodorkovsky and his many associates has been closely followed by various Russian media outlets. In recent months, as Khodorkovsky and his partner stand trial for a second time in Moscow, interviews with Khodorkovsky, as well as his articles written from behind bars, have appeared in a number of print and web media.24 Khodorkovsky’s correspondence with prominent Russian writer Lyudmila Ulitskaya was published in the literary journal Znamya in November 2009. Excerpts from the correspondence were reprinted by Novaya Gazeta and other media outlets. The above are but a few examples of journalistic work directly challenging or defying the authority of the state.

Most journalists working in these Moscow outlets are not crusaders akin to Anna Politkovskaya. If they are careful not to encroach on powerful interests, reporters working for prominent Moscow publications can get away with challenging specific government policies or high-ranking officials. As Putin’s remark on Politkovsksya’s death indicates, the federal government is somewhat sensitive to the “damage” caused by direct persecution of journalists. Consequently, Moscow prefers more subtle ways to deal with defiant reporters. The case of Natalia Morar, a young reporter of the New Times weekly magazine, is a good illustration.25 Morar authored the aforementioned series of articles alleging that high-ranking government officials siphoned huge sums of money abroad via certain Moscow banks. The government took advantage of the fact that she was not a Russian national (Morar was born and raised in Moldova, graduated from Moscow State University and was formally employed by the New Times). In late 2007, as she was returning from a foreign business trip, she was stopped at the border and denied entry to Russia. She has since been barred from entering Russia.

Provincial governments are less squeamish and less subtle. Reporters are often harassed, attacked, and even murdered, as cases of Togliatti and Khimki demonstrate. Occasionally, however, brave and committed reporters, acting as both journalists and human rights advocates, can sometimes make a difference and force local administrators to account for their performance.26

What about press freedom in Russia? The Kremlin repeatedly uses the existence of media diversity to prove that Russia does not have serious problems with freedom of the press. With so many media outlets, the argument goes, the government cannot possibly control all of them.27

It is true that the Kremlin tolerates free and critical voices, but it only does so as long as they remain politically irrelevant and have no impact on decision making. Indeed these media, and their limited audiences, may be referred to as “liberal ghettos.”28 The Kremlin is highly committed, however, to making sure that discontent does not spill over into political activism of any sort. So far it has mostly achieved this goal, drawing largely on manipulative techniques and generally refraining from more punitive measures.29

Controlled National Television

One reason why liberal outlets are marginal is that the media environment in Russia is dominated by three major national TV channels. The circulation of an average liberal daily or weekly is only tens of thousands, while national audiences are in tens of millions. A vast majority of the Russian adult population relies on them as their main or only source of national or international news.30

The three national channels work in a top-down manner, with one-way communication between the state and the citizens. As far as political and public affairs coverage is concerned, they are the government’s primary tool for shaping public opinion.

During the first post-communist decade, the state did not have full control over television media. Of the three major channels, one was government controlled, one was created and owned by media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky, and another was effectively controlled by business magnate Boris Berezovsky. In 2000, when Putin first became president, one of his primary goals was to reconsolidate the state. He steadily weakened all centers of power that could challenge the Kremlin authority: regional governors, the political opposition, the legislature, big business, and, of course, the national TV channels.31 During Putin’s first term, Gusinsky and Berezorsky were threatened with prosecution and chose to flee Russia. After the subsequent takeover of their assets by the state, abetted by the political consolidation of the elites, all three channels were transformed into Kremlin political resources. By the end of Putin’s first term, the control over national TV channels was honed to perfection.32

News coverage of the national channels is closely coordinated with the Kremlin, so that coverage is fairly similar from one channel to another.33 State control is by no means coercive: top television managers are members of the political elite and are the Kremlin’s willing partners. As far as political coverage is concerned, the message stays on cue—whatever the problems Russia may be facing, Putin and Medvedev are firmly in charge, and any political alternative is inconceivable. Both President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin are assured of ample presence on all three channels. This TV operation helps maintain high approval ratings for both leaders and a sense that there are no alternatives to the ruling tandem. From October 2008 through February 2010, Medvedev’s approval rating never dropped below 68 percent; Putin’s stayed between 76 and 86 percent despite the ongoing economic crisis.34 No one else in Russia comes close to their level of public support. The three channels perfectly serve the political goals of the government to shape electoral opinion by boosting, playing down, or ignoring an issue, a figure, or a group and instilling sentiments that benefit the political interests of the leadership. This is a sophisticated operation that capitalizes on and deepens existing suspicion of the West and frustration over Russia’s diminished status in the world.

Just as there is a lack of political competition in the public realm, there is no competition among the three channels as far as political coverage is concerned. When it comes to entertainment shows, however, the competition is fierce. Though all three channels operate as commercial entities that rely on advertising revenues, they remain tightly controlled by the state.35

Combining state propaganda with a lucrative business operation works because it generates state-of-the-art television entertainment, sustains audiences, and thus attracts advertisers. The advertising market was more robust and growing in the years preceding the current financial crisis, but even now national TV channels remain profitable.36 To many in Russia—especially provincial, older, less educated, and poorer constituencies—free national television is the only entertainment they can afford. Once they are glued to the screen by soap operas and other appealing shows, they also watch national news on the same channels.

It is not that the Russian audience takes every word and image at face value. Years of exposure to Soviet propaganda has taught people to treat government messages with a degree of skepticism. Russian audiences’ acceptance of the rules of the game enables the Kremlin to count on the support of the “national television constituency.” It is this majority that constitutes the electoral base of today’s leadership. The more sophisticated and inquisitive audiences may easily pick from a broad range of today’s media sources: cable TV in any language, the Internet and its new communications, and of course the domestic “liberal ghetto” of relatively independent media. Unlike in the Soviet days, there is no shortage of alternative sources, but rather a shortage of demand.37

Controlled television is an indispensable resource built by Putin and shared by Medvedev. Medvedev may sound more liberal than Putin, as he emphasizes the importance of freedom and talks about the need to follow the rule of law, but on the issue of television media Medvedev sees little problem with the way national TV is handled. “Mass media has developed not badly at all,” he said in a meeting with a popular Russian weekly newspaper Argumenty i Fakty. “In its quality and the means used, Russian television is among the best in the world…And it is not ‘pro-government,’” he added.38

Russia’s national TV outlets and its liberal media are strikingly different in their choices of news priorities and newsmakers, as well as in general tone. To keep the liberal media even more marginal, they are completely separated from the national channels There is no format such as the American tradition of “Meet the Press”; critically-minded print or web journalists do not appear on national television lest they imbue the electoral base with unwelcome ideas.

Another trick that keeps the relatively independent media marginalized is limiting their access to decision makers. Top policy makers or even their press officers do not hold regular public briefings. When Putin was president, he held one press conference per year attended by about one thousand journalists from all over Russia and beyond. This is hardly a format in which pointed policy questions may be asked. The Kremlin press pool is a closed group of trusted journalists.39 Those who have access to the ruling elite do not ask unwelcome questions and those who are more inquisitive do not have access.

As a result of the Kremlin-orchestrated redistribution of media assets undertaken during Putin’s presidency, the majority of prominent media ended up in loyal hands. While the transfer of media ownership does not always mean a prompt abandonment of editorial independence, it does make media outlets more vulnerable. Metal magnate Alisher Usmanov, for example, may have generally refrained from interfering with news coverage by Kommersant since he bought it in 2006, but it seems unlikely that he will choose to anger the government and risk his business interests for the sake of press freedom.

While fears of a crackdown may be real, the primary factors driving the marginalization of liberal media are the tightly controlled political environment and the lack of public interest in political participation.

Controlled Political Environment

The political regime that Putin built has the appearance of having democratic institutions, but they have been radically emasculated. There is little separation of powers, hardly any political opposition, election results are largely preordained, and decision making is heavily centralized and non-transparent.40 The system is dominated by the top figure, unchallenged and uncontested. This was the stature Putin achieved by the end of his second term as president. In his capacity as prime minister he retains a similar status, while President Medvedev is endowed with a similar kind of supremacy by virtue of being Putin’s partner. Loyalty to both among the political elites is an inherent element of the political order.

Some of the stories reported by the liberal media would likely cause broad public discussion or even political scandal if the political environment were more open. In Russia, this discussion is strongly limited because the legislature is dominated by a pro-Kremlin force that will not discuss issues or conduct investigations if the Kremlin disapproves such initiatives.41 The courts are similarly lacking in independence and cannot be relied on as arbiters if alleged wrongdoings by the government are involved. In politically sensitive cases, judicial rulings are easily bent by the executive. Even the rulings of the Constitutional Court appear to be driven by loyalty to the Kremlin rather than rule of law. Two judges of the Constitutional Court who persisted in holding independent opinions were recently pressured into quitting.42

The Kremlin’s leverage over lawmakers makes it possible to pass almost any bill the government needs without much discussion. Though the existing media law is fairly liberal and has not been rewritten since its adoption immediately after the collapse of the USSR, amendments to other legislation such as the electoral law and the law on extremism impose additional restrictions on the media.43 These amendments, which enable the Kremlin to suspend or even close publications, are rarely enforced. But their very existence, combined with selective law enforcement, increases the vulnerability of the media.

This is a major reason why in Russia media may report news, but not to the extent that it generates political fallout. The media can inform, but they do not have an impact. While there may be freedom of expression, there is hardly press freedom if the latter is understood to serve as a mechanism of public accountability.

Since liberal media operate at the discretion of the government, self-censorship has become common among journalists, though the degree of self-restriction varies. The Russian media’s lack of impact raises doubts about the meaning of journalistic effort—what is the point of digging deep and disclosing facts if they do not make a difference anyway? This also changes the nature of opinion and editorial writing: one is bound to preach to the converted in the “liberal ghetto” if the government will not pay attention to outside policy analysis. What is the point of arguing that more transparent and competitive decision making can reduce corruption and improve the quality of governance if the exercise of unchallenged power is the very essence of the current regime? The former editor of the op-ed page of Kommersant agreed that this environment forced him to re-format his section: “When you tell the government what to do, you feel stupid, because they are not listening. Everybody knows that they aren’t. Nobody’s pretending that they are. You can’t reach out to the other side.”44

The Public Mindset as a Factor of Reduced Media Role

By the late 1990s, Russia had made a decisive shift toward a market economy, but politically and socially it was ready for a return to the traditional political pattern based on the dominance of the state with an uncontested ruler concentrating power in his hands. When Vladimir Putin emerged as the new leader in 2000, he followed this pattern.45

The experience of the first post-communist decade failed to teach the majority the values of political rights, normative principles of democracy, or the advantages of a reduced state role in the economy. The Russian people did not come to regard these ideas as a means to make their lives better, seeing them curtailed or compromised during Putin’s tenure was therefore not regarded as a significant loss. Polls consistently show that a vast majority of Russians is in favor of the dominance and further expansion of the state in the economy and prefer the “current Russian system” to western democratic models.46 The paternalism that Putin offered was accepted with a sense of relief; people did not want the shared responsibility of decision making and the uncertainty that came with it.

Of course it helped Putin tremendously that the price of oil increased and raised Russia’s status in the world, but it should not be seen as a tradeoff in which people sacrificed their political rights in exchange for higher living standards. In fact, it was a sense of fatigue and a desire to lean on a leader who would be firmly in charge and assume the responsibility for Russia and its people.

When Putin emasculated the fledgling political institutions and, one by one, the channels of public participation were clogged, the public looked on with indifference. The majority unequivocally preferred the paternalism of the 2000s to the pluralism of the 1990s, and the current economic crisis so far has not changed this. The liberal constituencies may have been angry and bitter, but even in these circles there has been very little desire to organize and demand a return of political rights. Voicing discontent within the limits of the “liberal ghettos” appeared to be an acceptable arrangement. Active public groups are small, scarce, and enjoy very limited support.

The independent media can only work as an instrument of public accountability if the public demands that the government be held accountable. Independent media may play a crucial role even in undemocratic regimes if the public is keen to act, as the examples of Yugoslavia under Slobodan Milosevic and Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma demonstrated. In each of these cases it took just a few (or even a single) independent non-government media outlets to help people organize and eventually remove the government. But the media cannot generate activism that is not there, and in Russia, at least for now, it is simply not there.

If the public is generally indifferent and atomized, independent media will remain politically ineffective. Worse, it will gradually lose part of its independence, since the government easily encroaches on the public space if the society is apathetic and fragmented. Whereas in the Soviet days there was a shortage of sources of alternative, non-government information, today there is a shortage of public demand—both for a free press as well as for political participation or government accountability. While this is a blessing for the Kremlin elite who are anxious to secure the political status quo and consolidate their decision making powers, it is a curse for Russia’s democratic development.

A Chance for Greater Press Freedom?

The impact of independent media is inseparable from the larger issue of political pluralism. One way toward more pluralistic politics would be a public split of the Russian elites. Such a split prompted change during perestroika in which political pluralism, if often taking unsightly forms, was behind the vibrant political journalism of the 1990s.

During his presidency, Putin managed to consolidate the elites by a mixture of intimidation and opportunity. In addition to his paternalistic model of state-society relations, the consolidation of the elites was greatly abetted by high oil prices. Huge export revenues meant plenty of opportunity for enrichment. Putin presided over the distribution of access to power and property (the two being closely entangled in Russia), and his authority as the arbiter of this distribution was universally recognized. One had to be insane to challenge the superior arbiter, since such disloyalty led to the loss of opportunity, property and, in some cases, freedom. That is why powerful interests stay loyal and conflicts among them are resolved behind the scene. This arrangement works well as long as the resources are plentiful. Even as they have become more limited due to the current economic crisis, there is still enough to sustain stability. But what will happen when the resources deplete, and the elites have to share the “losses,” and not the “profits?”47 If the incentive to stay loyal is no longer there, the differences among the elites may come to the fore, and it will be a matter of time before elite factions reach out to the public to muster support. This would mean a return to political pluralism and competitive politics in Russia.48 If this were to happen, it would mean a simultaneous transformation of media into a vehicle of politics; freedom of expression would translate into press freedom; and the skills of independent journalism currently in low demand would once again become essential.

Without public demand for political rights and civil liberties—press freedom included—attempts by outside actors to promote democracy or improve the human rights situation are unlikely to make a difference. The Kremlin’s anti-American propaganda has repeatedly portrayed such attempts as meddling with Russia’s domestic affairs and motivated by ulterior motives such as spying or otherwise harming Russia.49 This perception is easy to instill when the target audience does not care much about human rights violations or compromised democratic procedures. In fact, people in Russia believe that today they have more freedom than they did in the 1990s.50

In their letter to President Barack Obama, over seventy U.S. lawmakers may have expressed concern about the killings of Natalia Estemirova, Stanislav Markelov, and Anastasia Baburova, but outside liberal and human rights circles the majority of Russians would hardly know their names.