Small States Reconsidered: Small is What WE Make of It

“They are big and I am small, and that is not fair, oh no!”

The quote above is from Calimero, an Italian animated television series about an anthropomorphized chicken. The chicken, Calimero, finds himself in situations where other people decide for him what to do and where to go. Calimero is not happy with his limitations but does not believe he can make any changes, so he complains and gets angry. However, nobody is listening to what he has to say. Calimero relates this to his size and famously utters: “They are big and I am small, and that is not fair, oh no!”^[1]

Introduction

Calimero’s quote serves as an analogy of how some states came to be known as small states. Over the years, much has been written about small states and their conceptualization. This scholarship has sparked a debate between objectivists that focus on neutral criteria such as population size and subjectivists that focus on personalized criteria such as individual perceptions. This article critically engages with both approaches and in so doing identifies their shortcomings, which in turn formalizes a gap in the existing literature on small states. It argues that the scholarship on small states lacks an intersubjective approach. This intersubjective approach builds on existing studies and is informed by qualitative data collected at the 25th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP25) in Madrid.^[2],^[3]

An intersubjective approach for defining small states is important, as the concept of small states is socially constructed and contentious. This means that there needs to be a shared understanding of when a state can be classified as small or otherwise. Without consensus, the concept of small states loses its significance and meaning—as demonstrated by current myriad definitions of small states. The polysemy of the term “small states” has undermined the credibility of the concept, leading to distortive appropriations of the term. The socially-constructed nature of small states further entails that the concept is subject to change—depending on how state actors identify their own and other states. These perceptions can be systematically investigated by analyzing official discourses and state practices.

The social construction of small states also implies that the concept does not have meaning unless we understand the social context in which it emerged.^[4] In fact, what it means to be a small state is historically contingent and shaped by power. The origin of the concept can be traced back to the rise of the modern state system, which was established in 1648 in Western Europe as an element of the two treaties constituting the Peace of Westphalia. The Westphalian state system is based on the principles of state sovereignty, equality among states, and non-intervention of one state in another state’s domestic affairs. Although the international state system is a Western European construct, developed without the involvement of non-Western states, it now encompasses every region in the world through Western territorial expansionism.^[5]

Western European practices constructed the concept of small states. Rothstein noted that the first endeavor to categorize states was the Treaty of Chaumont, which was signed in 1817 after the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.^[6] These wars had a dual effect on the European state system, as they created both unity and division. Due to their victory, France and the winning alliance of European states, including Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg Empire, gave these states special status as great powers.^[7] The other states were “deemed too inconsequential” and “came to be known as small states,”^[8] that is, states “left to obey the rules of the game, because they were too weak to be taken seriously when the rules were negotiated.”^[9]

The classification principle used in the Treaty of Chaumont is still in effect today as states continue to be defined as great powers and small states. This shows that the concept of small states has become so entrenched that it is taken for granted as natural. However, we can notice a few changes. First, whereas the category of small states was initially generated indirectly—as the focus was on big states while all other states were subsequently being characterized as small—states are now defined as small in relation to objective (e.g. population size) and subjective (e.g. individual perceptions) criteria. This shows that what it means to be a small state has changed over time. Second, and related to the first point, the conventional great power-small states dichotomy has been broadened to include other types of states. These days, states are labeled as one of the following five categories: superpowers, great powers, middle powers, small states, and mini or microstates.^[10] Although this categorization suggests clear boundaries between each category, the way in which states are differentiated remains vague and contentious.

The first section of this article critically engages with the classification of small states with a focus on the objective and subjective approaches for classifying states as small. Building on this discussion, the second section discusses the identification of small states while introducing an intersubjective approach that should be used to define states as small. This approach highlights the importance of a shared understanding among state actors of whether a state is small. The third section explains the implications of the intersubjective approach. Lastly, the concluding section points out the importance of an intersubjective approach for scholarship on small states.

Classification of Small States: Objective and Subjective Approaches

The academic literature shows that there is no consensus on what constitutes a small state. This incongruity has led some scholars to question the usefulness of the concept as an analytical tool. Baehr, for example, argued that most authors who want to use the concept struggle with the problem of definition and which criteria to adopt, as well as where to draw a line between large and small states. He explained that there are two main types of definitions: a clear and unambiguous definition, which he perceives as “arbitrary and intellectually difficult to defend;” and a more sophisticated definition, which is “more ambiguous and difficult to apply to concrete cases.”^[11] Both types of definitions have been adopted by scholars. They are detailed in this article as the objective and subjective approaches, respectively. The former foregrounds quantitative variables, whereas the latter highlights qualitative characteristics. Both approaches will be discussed below.

Objective Approach

The objective approach to defining states as small focuses on tangible and quantifiable criteria. The criterion applied in these studies is size, manifested through the area of a state’s territory, its population, economy, and military. Of these, the most applied criterion has been population size.^[12] These criteria are problematic, as they have often been applied in arbitrary ways. For instance, writing half a century ago, Marriott and Masaryk classified European states with a population of less than 20 million as small.^[13] Vital, on the other hand, distinguished between economically advanced and underdeveloped countries. He set the demarcation line at 10 to 15 million for the former and increased it to 20 to 30 million for the latter.^[14] Vellut combined a population limit of 10 to 50 million and/or a per capita gross domestic product level of no more US$2,000,^[15] whereas Clarke and Payne defined a state as small if it has a population under one million.^[16] Likewise, in the contemporary era, international organizations such as the Commonwealth and the World Bank have adopted an objective approach, as they classify countries with a population under 1.5 million as small.^[17]

These studies show that the criteria and cut-off points used by scholars are both straightforward and yet subjective, as they vary from one study to another. This can be explained by the nature of the approach, which constitutes a clear and unambiguous definition of small states.^[18] Another explanation can be found in contextual circumstances. Crowards, for example, explained that the population cut-off points changed over time due to an increase in the number of states, which then meant that a higher cut-off point would include the vast majority of countries within the category of small states.^[19] The number of states first increased due to decolonization and then with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.^[20] This, again, shows the social construction of the concept of small states, as the understanding of a small state changed over time depending on the historical context and the agency of scholars who have the power to include or exclude states from the small states category.

The objective approach is useful in that it uses definite criteria to categorize states as small, which therefore makes it easy to define small states. However, the approach elicits important questions about applicability and validity. For example, the boundary between big and small states is artificial and arbitrarily drawn, which means that it can seldom be taken for granted.^[21] In this way, it is difficult to justify why a state with 20 million people should be a great power and a state with 18 million should be a small state, using population measurements alone.^[22]

Furthermore, Armstrup has emphasized that size is a very vague concept, which easily lends itself to different interpretations.^[23] One such interpretation can be found in Rappard’s study on small states in the League of Nations, in which he argued that the smallness of states does not depend on the population of a state or its economy. Instead, he deemed that “the small states within the League of Nations have nothing in common which distinguishes them from others, except that they enjoy no permanent representation on the Council.”^[24] In other words, enduring membership in the League of Nations became the rubric for defining small states. Small states were, according to Rappard, deprived from permanent representation on the Council because they were not considered to be Great Powers.^[25] This viewpoint opens the prospect for a subjective approach to conceptualize small states.

Subjective Approach

The subjective approach to defining states as small is based on qualitative criteria such as perceptions and the notion of comparison. For instance, Hey defines a state as small when its citizens and institutions perceive themselves as small or if another state perceives that state as small.^[26] Bjøl, on the other hand, focuses on comparison, arguing that Belgium can be categorized as a small state when it is compared to France but should be classified as a large state if compared to Luxembourg.^[27] Likewise, Steinmetz, and Wivel define a small state as “the weak part in an asymmetric relationship.”^[28] This approach suggests that a state can be both weak in one relation and powerful in another.

Another group of scholars utilizes psychological dimensions when defining states as small. Edis, for example, states that “‘smallness,’ like beauty, is to some extent in the eye of the beholder.”^[29] This means that different people can have different opinions about what a small state is. Additionally, states have been defined as small in relation to security issues. Rothstein, for instance, defined a state as small when it cannot obtain security by its own capabilities and thus requires external help.^[30] Other scholars have focused on the role and influence that states have in the international system. For instance, Keohane classifies small states as “system ineffectual states,” which he defines as states that can do little to influence the system.^[31]

Although the subjective approach offers a different way to conceptualize small states, it has limitations as well. For instance, Hey’s approach only takes individual perceptions into account, whereas the comparative approach reflects the same underlying notions as the objective approach.^[32] Furthermore, Bjøl^[33] and Steinmetz and Wivel’s^[34] approach to defining states as small is informed by tangible resources, as exemplified by the comparison of Belgium to France and to Luxembourg. Furthermore, their approach benefits from a bilateral focus, as it is relatively easy to identify the weaker part in a bilateral relationship but more difficult to do so in a multilateral one. Likewise, a focus on the security of small states^[35] can be questioned. As most states are not security self-sufficient, it is unclear how we can measure the impact of states on the international system,^[36] since a state can have an impact in one area though not in another.

The objective and subjective approaches to defining small states are a continuation of the classification principle used in the Treaty of Chaumont. These approaches involve a systematic arrangement of states in categories according to externally-imposed objective and subjective criteria. Building on the objective and subjective approaches, this article puts forward an intersubjective approach to define states as small based on identification rather than classification.

Identification of Small States: An Intersubjective Approach

The intersubjective approach to defining states as small is informed by the constructivist school of thought, which argues that the social world is of our making.^[37] In other words, the nature of reality and the nature of knowledge are socially constructed.^[38] This may also be applied to the concept of small states, as explained above. Small states exist because they have been created and accepted by different actors. The concept does not have inherent meaning; the only meaning it has is the meaning given to it.^[39]

The intersubjective approach proposed in this article argues that there needs to be a shared understanding between states that a certain state is small. See Diagram 1:

Diagram 1: Shared Understanding

Diagram 1 shows a shared understanding between two states, state A and state B, though this does not mean that a shared understanding need only occur between two states. A shared understanding of small states can occur among multiple states depending on the states that are involved. The key idea is that states are perceived as small when they meet the following two conditions:

1. State actors of state A identify their state as small, and

2. State actors of other states identify state A as small as well.

The intersubjective approach is an agential approach, as the focus is on how state actors identify their own and other states. The emphasis is on state actors because they represent and act on behalf of the state and share the same commitment to state identity.^[40] State identity is socially constructed through interaction with other states. It is a representation of state actors’ understanding of what kind of state their country is, which in turn forms the basis of their interests, decisions, and actions on national, regional, and global levels.^[41] States that conform to a certain identity are expected to comply with the norms that are associated with that identity.^[42] This idea, it should be noted, comes with an expectation that some kinds of behavior and action are more acceptable than others.^[43] This process is also known as “the logic of appropriateness,” where actors behave in certain ways believing that this behavior is appropriate.^[44]

The intersubjective approach suggested in this article does not disregard the objective and subjective approaches discussed earlier, as the social world is made up of material and ideational structures at the core of the two current approaches. The intersubjective approach acknowledges that shared understandings of what constitutes a small state can be influenced by objective and/or subjective criteria. In other words, objective and subjective criteria can function as identity markers in defining states as small. The key difference of this new approach, however, is that it requires a shared understanding between state actors that a given state is small, rather than that given state being classified as small solely based on quantitative variables or individual qualitative characteristics. The three approaches to defining small states are located in Diagram 2.

As shown in Diagram 2, the intersubjective approach occupies the middle ground between the objective and subjective approach. The objective approach is based on facts that can be verified and measured, including tangible criteria such as the size of a state’s population, economy, or military. Subjective criteria, on the other hand, are interpretations based on individual feelings or perceptions, including comparison between states. The intersubjective approach embraces the characteristics of both approaches while centering on shared understanding between state actors of different states. This approach creates new opportunities for the theoretical and empirical investigation of small states.

Diagram 2: Intersubjective Understanding

It is important here to differentiate between the three approaches, as state actors’ understanding of their state might differ from how scholars or international organizations understand a small state. A case in point is Pacific Island Countries (PICs), which have been classified as small island states and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) by scholars^[45] and international organizations like the United Nations.^[46] Semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with Pacific island leaders at COP25 reveal that state actors of PICs do not view their own countries as small states but rather as large ocean states. This identification is informed by their connection to, and dependence on, the Pacific Ocean, which includes their exclusive economic zones (EEZ).

PICs’ self-identification as large ocean states is empowering, as they have become global leaders on ocean governance and the climate-ocean nexus, which in turn has enabled PICs to push the global agenda and project themselves as stewards of the ocean on the global stage.^[47] PICs’ identity as large ocean states is now acknowledged and accepted by scholars,^[48] international organizations,^[49] commentators,^[50] and other state actors.^[51] For instance, during his public lecture at the University of the South Pacific,^[52] United States Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro referred to PICs as large ocean states. He stated, “As large ocean nations like yourselves, with the world’s most expansive exclusive economic zones, you best understand how critical it is to monitor and control your own waters.”^[53]

Implications of the Intersubjective Approach

Intersubjectivity is fundamental to the production of social meaning and knowledge.^[54] The concept of small states exists because the alliance of European states and France first assigned special status to their countries as great powers with other states classified as small states. This practice shows that the social construction of small states is a major dimension of political power.^[55] It emerged out of power, and those states that were classified as small had no say in their own classifications—hence the reference to Calimero’s quote at the onset of this article: “They are big and I am small, and that is not fair, oh no!”

Burger and Luckmann explain this process as one of externalization, which proposes that meaning is carried and communicated to the outside world.^[56] The winning alliance of European states and France felt superior to other countries based on their victory in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This feeling of superiority gained momentum when it was maintained through discourses and practices and when others agreed that their victory made them superior to other states. As a result, small states became a social fact. Once the social fact of small states was established, actors started to objectify this reality by institutionalizing^[57] it and by establishing a scholarly sub-discipline known as small states studies. Over time, these practices legitimized the concept of small states by giving them cognitive and linguistic bases, thereby embedding small states in the social world and its functioning. Subsequently, the concept of small states was internalized, as the externalized and objectified understandings of the concept were accepted. As a result, the concept of small states has become a valid truth.

External classifications of small states are biased, as such classifications limit the agency and power of what are understood as “small” states. They restrict the abilities of these small states to fully develop their potentials and contribute to global affairs, highlighted by the example of PICs. Furthermore, the external classification of small states disempowers these states in their social relations, as others will adjust their behavior^[58] in line with what it means to be a small state. What is possible and not possible is circumscribed by the meaning attached to the classifications of small states. Rather than empowering external actors, an intersubjective approach to define small states transfers power back to state actors. This is of paramount importance, for the power of a state depends on, and thus is limited by, its recognition within the community of states and the international community at large. It also empowers states to do things they could not have otherwise done if they were classified as small states. This instantiates the nexus of social production of knowledge, power, and action.^[59]

An intersubjective approach also enables state actors to identify their state the way they see fit. This means that state actors can redefine the identity of their state, rather than adhering to an externally-applied, antiquated classification system. This is a salient transformation, which rewrites history. It should not be the sole prerogative of great powers or scholars to categorize states or to sustain the historically-situated classification system of states. Specifically, there is a difference between the concepts developed by social scientists and how these concepts are understood in everyday context.^[60] Current classifications of small states are abstract understandings, whereas an intersubjective approach looks at how state actors understand and identify their state. This is an example of theory from Clifford Geertz, who refers to the former as distant-near concepts and the latter as experience-near concepts.^[61]

The implications of applying an intersubjective approach to the classification of small states go beyond the study of small states. This approach offers a novel means of classifying states in general, be they large, medium, small, or micro. Additionally, this approach provides conventionally “small” states the opportunity to determine their own fates and influence events in the international system.

Furthermore, the policy implications of the discussions in this paper are significant. By understanding how small states have been classified and acknowledging the power that is central to these classifications, policy makers can bring greater critical awareness to the identification of their state and, relatedly, the policy-making process. After all, any policy is informed by interests, which in turn are informed by identifications. Identifications are a prerequisite for interest because actors cannot know what they want until they know who they are.^[62] This means that different identities will generate different interests and (inter)actions.

Conclusion

This article revisited the concept of small states by demonstrating that small is what we make of it. Building on the objective and subjective approaches to defining small states, and qualitative data collected at COP25, the article put forward an intersubjective approach that calls for a shared understanding of smallness. This approach occupies the middle ground between the objective and subjective approaches. The former is based on facts that can be verified and measured, such as population size, whereas the latter is based on individual perceptions, including comparison between states.

An intersubjective approach focuses on shared perceptions of state actors rather than on individual and externally-applied criteria. An intersubjective approach is important as the categorization of small states is politically and externally driven. This means that state actors’ understanding of their state might differ from how scholars or international organizations see their state. A case in point is PICs, which have tradition ally been classified as small island states or SIDS by scholars and international organizations. Data collected at COP25 shows that state actors of PICs do not see their countries as small states, but rather as large ocean states. PICs’ large ocean state identity is acknowledged by other state actors, scholars, and international organizations. This shows that there is, in fact, a shared understanding of PICs as large ocean states. The new shared understanding of PICs as large ocean states increases their political clout, which then becomes visible in the global leadership role that they have adopted in the fight against ocean impacts and climate change.

An intersubjective approach also entails that state actors can identify their state the way they see fit. State actors can redefine the identity of their state rather than adhering to an externally applied age-old classification system. This is a salient transformation as it rewrites history that it should not be the prerogative of great powers or scholars to categorize states or to sustain the ancient classification system of states. There is a difference between the concepts developed by social scientists and how these concepts are understood in everyday context. Current classifications of small states are abstract understandings whereas an intersubjective approach looks at how state actors understand and identify their state.

An intersubjective approach will also invite scholars to reflect upon their academic practices, which reproduce and reinforce knowledge. It is important that scholars take notice of the distinctions that state actors make so that scholars discover a better vantage on how these state actors perceive their own states, other states, and their social world. This will also enhance the quality of data generated, as well as the knowledge that is produced.

^[1] See https://www.calimero.com/.

^[2] Sarina Theys, “COP25 and Pacific island states: ‘we are keen to lead, not to be led,’” Medium, January 9, 2020, https://medium.com/international-affairs-blog/cop25-and-pacific-island-states-we-are-keen-tolead-not-to-be-led-ced74ece0f4e.

^[3] The author was an Observer at COP25 in Madrid during which she conducted semi-structured interviews with state leaders and state actors of different Pacific island countries.

^[4] Sarina Theys, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theory, eds. S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017), 36-41.

^[5] Henry Kissinger, World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History (London: Penguin Books, 2015).

^[6] Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

^[7] Carsten Holbraad, “The concert of Europe,” Australian Outlook 25, no. 1 (1970): 29-44.

^[8] Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, “Introduction: Lilliputians in Gulliver’s World?,” in Small States in International Relations, eds. C. Ingebritsen, I.V. Neumann, S. Gstöhl, and J. Beyer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 5.

^[9] Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes, and Clive Archer, “Setting the scene: small states and international security,” in Small States and International Security, ed. C. Archer, A.J.K. Bailes, and A. Wivel (London and New York: Routledge, 2014) p. 3.

^[10] Carsten Holbraad, “The Role of Middle Powers,” Cooperation and Conflict 2, no. 6 (1971): 77-90.

^[11] Peter R. Baehr, “Small States: A Tool for Analysis,” World Politics 27, no. 3 (1975): 459.

^[12] Tom Crowards, “Defining the Category of ‘Small’ States,” Journal of International Development 14, no. 2 (2002): 143-179.

^[13] John A. R. Marriott, Federalism and the Problem of the Small State (London: Allen and Unwin, 1943); T. G. Masaryk, The Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis (London: Athlone Press, 1966).

^[14] David Vital, “The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations,” in Small States in International Relations, ed. C. Ingebritsen, I.V. Neumann, S. Gstöhl, and J. Beyer (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 77-88.

^[15] Jean-Luc Vellut, “Smaller States and the Problem of War and Peace: Some Consequences of the Emergence of Smaller States in Africa,” Journal of Peace Research 4, no. 3 (1967): 252-269.

^[16] Colin Clarke and Tony Payne, eds., Politics, Security, and Development in Small States (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

^[17] “Small States,” Commonwealth, accessed on May 15, 2016, http://thecommonwealth.org/our-work/ small-states; “Small States,” World Bank, accessed on May 15, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/ country/smallstates.

^[18] Cf. Peter R. Baehr, “Small States: A Tool for Analysis,” World Politics 27, no. 3 (1975): 459.

^[19] Tom Crowards, “Defining the Category of ‘Small’ States,” Journal of International Development 14, no. 2 (2002): 143-179.

^[20] Alan K. Henrikson, “A coming ‘Magnesian’ age? Small states, the global system, and the international community,” Geopolitics 6, no. 3 (2001): 49-86.

^[21] Cf. Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, “Introduction,” in Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities, eds. R. Steinmetz and A. Wivel (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 3-14.

^[22] Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What Would We Like to Know?,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19, no. 4 (2006): 651-668.

^[23] Niels Amstrup, “The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts,” Cooperation and Conflict 11, no. 3 (1976): 163-182.

^[24] William E. Rappard, “Small States in the League of Nations,” Political Science Quarterly 49, no. 4 (1934): 544.

^[25] Ibid.

^[26] Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducing Small State Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A.K. Hey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 1-12.

^[27] Erling Bjøl, “The Small State in International Politics,” in Small States in International Relations, eds. A. Schou and A.O. Brundtland (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1971), 29-37.

^[28] Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, “Introduction,” in Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities, eds. R. Steinmetz and A. Wivel (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 6.

^[29] Richard Edis, “Punching above their weight: How small developing states operate in the contemporary diplomatic world,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 5, no. 2 (1991): 45.

^[30] Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

^[31] Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 296.

^[32] Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducing Small State Foreign Policy,” in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A.K. Hey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 1-12.

^[33] Erling Bjøl, “The Small State in International Politics,” in Small States in International Relations, eds. A. Schou and A.O. Brundtland (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell, 1971), 29-37.

^[34] Robert Steinmetz and Anders Wivel, “Introduction,” in Small States in Europe: Challenges and Opportunities, eds. R. Steinmetz and A. Wivel (Surrey and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2010), 3-14.

^[35] Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968).

^[36] Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,” International Organization 23, no. 2 (1969): 296.

^[37] Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); Emanuel Adler, “Constructivism in International Relations: Sources, Contributions, and Debates,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, and B.A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2013), 112-144.

^[38] Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Sarina Theys, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theory, eds. S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017), 36-41.

^[39] Peter L. Burger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).

^[40] A state can have different identities, but for the purpose of this article, the focus is on small state identity.

^[41] Sarina Theys, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theory, eds. S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017), 36-41.

^[42] Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

^[43] Sarina Theys, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theory, eds. S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017), 36-41.

^[44] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” International Organization 52, no. 4 (1998): 951-952.

^[45] See, for instance, John Campbell and Jon Barnett, Climate Change and Small Island States (London: Routledge, 2010).

^[46] “About Small Island Developing States,” United Nations, https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states#:~:text=Small%20Island%20Developing%20States%20 (SIDS,social%2C%20economic%20and%20environmental%20vulnerabilities.

^[47] Luis Felipe López-Calva, “Finance, partnerships and innovation: Large ocean states pave the way to the 2030 Agenda,” UNDP Blog, November 1, 2018, https://www.undp.org/blog/finance-partnershipsand-innovation-large-ocean-states-pave-way-2030-agenda; Sarina Theys, “Leading the Way: Pacific Island Countries and the United Nations Climate Change Negotiations,” Comparative Law Journal of the Pacific 26 (2021): 203-220.

^[48] See, for instance, Nicholas Chan, “‘Large Ocean States’: Sovereignty, Small Islands, and Marine Protected Areas in Global Oceans Governance,” Global Governance 24 (2018): 537-555; and Leonardo Bernard et al, “Securing the Limits of Large Ocean States in the Pacific: Defining Baselines Limits and Boundaries amidst Changing Coastlines and Sea Level Rise,” Geosciences 11, no. 394 (2021): 1-20.

^[49] See, for instance, Jonathan Hall, “The Ocean State of Fiji – Turning the tide,” UNICEF Pacific Islands Stories, October 15, 2017, https://www.unicef.org/pacificislands/stories/ocean-state-fiji-turning-tide; and “The OECS – from SIDS to Large Ocean States,” Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, September 24, 2020 https://pressroom.oecs.org/the-oecs-from-sids-to-large-ocean-states.

^[50] “Looking back at the One Ocean Summit: What commitments for the ocean?” Ocean and Climate Platform, February 12, 2022, https://ocean-climate.org/en/looking-back-at-the-one-ocean-summit-whatcommitments-for-the-ocean/; Catherine Putz, “Aidan Craney: Youth in Fiji and Solomon Islands,” The Diplomat, May 17, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/aidan-craney-youth-in-fiji-and-solomonislands/; Angelo Villagomez, Miriam Goldstein, and Anne Christianson, “Implementing Ocean Climate Solutions and Marine Protected Areas Require U.S. Leadership at the Our Ocean Conference,” The Center for American Progress, April 12, 2022, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/implementingocean-climate-solutions-and-marine-protected-areas-require-u-s-leadership-at-the-our-ocean-conference/.

^[51] Embassy of the United States of America, “The United States Defense Attaché Visits Fiji’s Minister of Defence,” Fiji Sun, October 27, 2021, https://fijisun.com.fj/2021/10/27/the-united-states-defenseattache-visits-fijis-minister-of-defense/; “Statement by Minister for Natural Resources and Labour, Honourable Melvin M. Turnbull, at the United Nations Ocean Conference in Lisbon, Portugal 2022,” Government of Virgin Islands, June 30, 2022, https://bvi.gov.vg/media-centre/statement-honourable-turnbull-un-ocean-conference-portugal.

^[52] Carlos Del Toro, “Welcome to the Public Lecture featuring Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro,” filmed June 15, 2022 at the U.S. Embassy Suva, Fiji, video, 55:54, https://www.facebook.com/watch/ live/?ref=watch_permalink&v=3140480409541400.

^[53] Ibid.

^[54] Sarina Theys, “Constructivism,” in International Relations Theory, eds. S. McGlinchey, R. Walters, and C. Scheinpflug (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2017), 36-41.

^[55] Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

^[56] Peter L. Burger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1966).

^[57] Alliance of Small Island States: https://www.aosis.org/about/; The Commonwealth: https://thecommonwealth.org/our-work/small-states#:~:text=The%20Commonwealth%20defines%20small%20 states,Namibia%2C%20and%20Papua%20New%20Guinea; The World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/smallstates; United Nations: https://www.un.org/ohrlls/content/about-small-island-developing-states#:~:text=Small%20Island%20Developing%20States%20(SIDS,social%2C%20 economic%20and%20environmental%20vulnerabilities.

^[58] See Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

^[59] Stefano Guzzini, “A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 6, no. 2 (2000): 147-182.

^[60] Frederic C. Schaffer, Elucidating Social Science Concepts: An Interpretivist Guide (New York and London: Routledge, 2016).

^[61] Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1983).

^[62] Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).