The Overdue Climate Justice of Loss and Damage

The following is the issue's winning entry for the Andrew Wellington Cordier Student Essay contest and appears in vol. 75, no. 1, "Insecurities: The 75th Anniversary Issue, 1947-2022" (Fall/Winter 2022).

By Aparajita Suresh Rao

Introduction

In October 2022, while I was preparing to leave for COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, I was being asked whether “COP” was short for Copenhagen. Soon after my return, at Thanksgiving dinner, I was being asked how the Conference of Parties (COP27) had gone, whether certain influential leaders had attended, and why a purse had been opened for loss and damage with no indication of where the money would come from.

“How was the temptation of a fund enough to ensure climate justice for countries that barely contribute to climate change?” “It would be easier for us to move inland in larger countries if we must. But what about countries with nowhere inland to run?” “If we want to contribute our Christmas charity to a climate fund, what fund can we choose?” Climate change had gone from being scientific gibberish I spewed at the dinner table to everyone’s truth. It is urgent and now.

The Honourable Maldivian Minister Aminath Shauna rightly and succinctly illustrated the urgency of climate action during her closing speech at COP27 in November 2022: “We have just 86 months to fix this.” The Republic of Maldives is a collection of 1,192 small, low-lying coral islands. 26 of these are natural coral atolls and 194 are inhabited. Approximately 80% of the islands are lower than one meter above sea level. For the Maldives, climate change poses a devastating and existential threat. To quote Minister Shauna for CNBC, “There’s no higher ground for us ... it’s just us, it’s just our islands and the sea.”[1]

However, this is not a story unique to Maldives. This story embraces all Small Island Developing States (SIDS)—notwithstanding the threat to freshwater resources, which is perpetuated by salt-water intrusion in the fresh underground water present in small pockets across small islands. In the short term, island states are vulnerable to gradual sea-level rise and inundation. These factors will exacerbate issues of beach erosion that already impact low-lying areas. The coral reefs that surround island states are threatened by warming seawater and pollution from anthropogenic, or human in origin, sources. The impending impacts on both tourism and the fishing industry are of great concern to these small economies, further impacting the livelihood of local and indigenous peoples. For example, in Fiji, a loss of Indigenous Fishing Knowledge (IFK) as transmitted verbally across generations could erode sustainable fishing practices maintained over time.[2] Finally, given the existential nature of the climate threat, SIDS confront a myriad of non-economic losses[3] across their culture, heritage, and homeland.

This piece will address what the COP for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is and give a brief introduction of the stakeholders involved in this process. It will then provide a short history of Loss and Damage. The piece will then contextualize the Loss and Damage Fund that emerged from COP27 in November 2022. Finally, it will bring forward the importance of Loss and Damage to the conversation around Climate Justice.

What is a COP?

COP was originally designed to be an inclusive process, enabling a variety of actors to participate in global climate negotiations. More formally, it is the “supreme decision-making body of the Convention.” All states that are party to the UNFCCC are represented at annual COP meetings. The two-week-long event allows all members of the convention to review and revise any decisions made at the COP. Consequently, it allows these members to determine the process of the implementation of the decisions that are adopted.

During a training conversation, a manager of mine at the International Peace Institute described a COP as a “two-week long affair that is nothing short of a 3-ring circus,” as illustrated in Figure 1. The Blue Zone is where the negotiations happen. Situated behind a security checkpoint, it requires a special badge to enter. It holds the official plenary space, rooms where negotiation are held, office space, and a section for side events. My manager always depicted it as “the backyard[i] of the circus where the Ringmaster makes all the decisions of how the circus should run.”

Figure 1: Conference of Parties (COP) as a Circus

Figure 1: Conference of Parties (COP) as a Circus

Source: Author

Here, technical experts from each of the COP signatory nations gather for 15 to 20 hours per day to discuss the details of each of three treaties signed by nations.[4] These treaties, the COP, CMA, and CMP, delineate the discussions and administratively take place at the same time every year. In 2022, the 27th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC took place. This was staged alongside the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (CMP), its 17th meeting. The Conference of Parties to the Paris Agreement of 2015 (CMA), in its 4th meeting, was also held.[5]

The Green Zone is where civil society and businesses set up shop. A short distance from the Blue Zone, it typically features side events including exhibits, events, panels, cultural performances, and workshops; akin to the main stage of a circus. Usually, the proceedings are conducted by civil society organizations and indigenous groups, businesses, academia, youth, and artists. Finally, the outer ring is where the pressure to act and perform at COP originates. Global civil society gathers outside the COP space to help influence decision-makers. This may be attempted through demonstration and stunts, as well as more traditional forms of advocacy.

What is Loss and Damage?

In October 2022, during an interview published on the UN Climate Action website, Adelle Thomas, lead author of the 2022 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report “Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability”[6] and the “Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5° C,”[7] discussed the importance of “loss and damage” before the upcoming COP27. While there is no agreed-upon definition of Loss and Damage within the UNFCCC, Thomas defined loss and damage as “the negative impacts of climate change that occur despite, or in the absence of, mitigation and adaptation.”[8]

To simplify, anthropogenic climate change—in addition to extreme, intense weather events—is causing irreversible harm to both human and natural ecosystems, the impact of which is transboundary in nature. Loss and Damage further encompasses slow-onset events as described above, such as sea level rise, ocean acidification, salinization, forest and land degradation, loss of biodiversity, and desertification. Often, the severity of these impacts means that measures for mitigation and adaptation cannot prevent the economic and non-economic destruction that come from the damage and the ensuing loss.

We face a unique moment in history, where we have encountered a combination of unprecedented and interconnected crises. First, the cost crisis, which includes high costs of living due to the food and energy crisis, perpetuated by the war in Ukraine and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Second, the debt crisis, which is impoverishing developing countries. Finally, the climate crisis. All have prevented institutions from progressing and attending to loss and damage, yet COP27 remained the opportunity to rejuvenate attempts at a funding facility for loss and damage.

A Matter of Historic Responsibility

Loss and damage has remained contentious within the UNFCCC, with several disagreements over the recognition of the historical responsibility of states in the Global North for past emissions. Several calls have been issued for reparations to be paid to developing countries to acknowledge those historical emissions and address the present and future climate crisis. The Paris Agreement recognized the lead that developed countries must take to combat climate change in accordance with their “common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC).[9]

Many countries from the Global South face historic reasons for slow growth and development over time. Some of these nations are high emitters today, while others barely contribute to global emissions. Focusing economic energies on climate change are especially difficult when the struggle to develop infrastructure, industry, agriculture, education, and healthcare is immense. Civil society in particular seeks to address this climate injustice. It also continues to call for countries of the Global North to address the inequality and injustices that arise from decades of exploitation and the colonization of nations in the global South.

What Has Been Done So Far?

There has long been a call for financing of solutions to loss and damage. However, since the establishment of UNFCCC three decades ago, there has been little movement.

During the formation of UNFCCC in 1991, Vanuatu, on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), proposed the creation of an insurance scheme that would deliver financial support to nations effected by sea level rise based on what is now CBDR-RC. This received no traction at the time.[10] In 2013, the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage was created at COP19. It had the objective of addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts, “including extreme events and slow onset events in countries particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.”[11] WIM discussed developing knowledge capacity, as well as strengthening dialogue around and expanding action and support to address loss and damage. Its implementation would be guided by an Executive Committee. The Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM excom) provides guidance for the implementation of the functions of the WIM.[12]

In 2015, Article 8 of the Paris Agreement first recognized loss and damage.[13] This was a huge breakthrough for policymakers, as it elevated loss and damage to the so-called “third pillar” of UNFCCC’s climate policy, alongside mitigation and adaptation. Here, “averting, minimizing and addressing Loss and Damage” became prominent.[14]

In 2019, at COP25 in Madrid, the WIM was strengthened and the Santiago Network on Averting, Minimising and Addressing Loss and Damage (SNLD)[15] was established under the Conference of Parties (COP) and the Paris Agreement (CMA). The objective of SNLD would be to provide technical assistance through relevant stakeholders to, as the name suggests, avert, minimize, and address loss and damage at the local, national, and regional levels. Additionally—and consequentially—there was a call for funding, and several financial estimates to address loss and damage began to be drawn up at this time.

Loss and Damage at COP27

Several contributions were made to a loss and damage fund prior to the establishment of this agreement on the final day of the conference. These came from countries such as Austria, Belgium, and New Zealand, all pledging non-trivial contributions. While these commitments totalling nearly $280m would not amount to the true needs of vulnerable states, an issue so far considered delicate was now receiving due credit in climate finance.

Another joint initiative that deserves recognition is the “Global Shield,”[16] led by Germany alongside the G7 and climate-vulnerable nations, the V20 group.[17] The aim of Global Shield is to support developing countries through climate risk insurance and social protection schemes.[18]

As COP27, the “Implementation COP,” drew to a close on its final day at Sharm el-Sheikh, the negotiations delivered “new funding arrangements”[19] to assist developing countries, including vulnerable nations and SIDS. Lauded as a genuine breakthrough after years of advocacy from the most vulnerable countries, it remains to be seen what happens with this new and additional fund over the next year. There are several questions that will need to be addressed before the operationalization of the fund such as defining of L&D under the Paris Agreement and what are the gaps and limitations to financing and implementation.[20]

A Mosaic of Solutions to Loss and Damage Finance

Given this progress, “we need a mosaic of solutions,” to use the words of Minister Shauna of Maldives at the closing plenary of COP27, to address and support this loss and damage funding arrangement. This mosaic of proposed solutions is discussed below.

Within the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC

The Green Climate Fund (GCF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), and Adaptation Fund are all set up under the Financial Mechanism of the UNFCCC. Taken together, these three funds receive a mixed reaction from the climate community as an instantiation of loss and damage funding.

For example, with the GCF, several projects were referenced and their success lauded during negotiating sessions. Equally, there was criticism of the GCF due to its lengthy process of establishment, its cumbersome country accreditation process, and the rigorous qualifications in place to receive funding.[21] Anecdotally, there was criticism for the added reporting burden for governments that had minimal climate governance capacity.

An argument can be made for the stringent process of the GCF aiding an evolution in static government climate policy and accountability. However, as is apparent from the layers of qualification required to obtain funding within UNFCCC, implementing programs with such detailed transparency mechanisms can slow down the disbursement of funding. While this may work for slow-onset events, a similar paradigm could be highly problematic and not be fit-for-purpose at a time of emergency. Consider, for example, the issue of World Bank adaptation funding being unavailable for use to support the loss and damage caused by the calamitous floods of 2022 which caused $14.9 billion of damage in Pakistan.[22]

The Bridgetown Agenda

The Bridgetown Initiative,[23] announced by Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley in September 2022, offered solutions to loss and damage that aimed to provide emergency liquidity through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially to countries that could not afford additional debt. It called to expand multilateral development bank (MDB) lending to governments. Included was a push to re-channel unused Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)ii to states that need it. The initiative, led by Avinash Persaud, the special envoy to Prime Minister Mottley, addresses the concern caused by an immediate liquidity requirement for small island states in case of rapid onset climate events, especially considering their limited fiscal space to borrow finances. It activates the reformation of the method in which World Bank and IMF have historically disbursed funding, urging them to consider different models of funding aimed at addressing climate damages.

IMF and World Bank

Invoking elements of the Bridgetown Agenda, a timely paper published by Michael Franczack (Options for a Loss and Damage Financial Mechanism, 2022),[24] released just prior to COP27, asks us to consider important questions of where this fund will be located, who will pay for it, in whose control it will be, and, finally, what it will do. Franczack suggests that financing could be obtained from outside the UNFCCC system: “L&D can be mainstreamed into global multilateral financial mechanisms.”

He also proposes elaborating on the COP26 decision text that mentions special drawing rights (SDRs),[ii] complementing the IMF’s recent development of a Resilience and Sustainability Trust.[25] Further, he suggests approaching the World Bank to provide long-term concessional finance that would be required to tackle the slow-onset loss and damage. COP27 in its decision texts opened the doors to discuss such funding options with MDBs and international financial institutions (IFIs). This flows nicely into considering the impacts to the fiscal capacity of nations when dealing with climate concerns and offers a “mosaic” of solutions for blended finance options.

Sources of Funding

Over the years, several options have been proposed to finance a loss and damage fund. The donor base consistent with the Paris Agreement would be states from the Global North, yet the language in the decision text from COP27 opens this up to voluntary funding from larger, developing nations. There were even calls during negotiations for grant-based funding and more non-concessional loans from MDBs. Some states proposed taxes and levies; for example, levies on airline travel and fossil fuel extraction are commonly quoted.[26]

The importance of the mosaic of solutions for loss and damage is crucial, and it must be viewed in addition to and containing aspects of adaptation and mitigation. It provides solutions to the most vulnerable nations, usually also the lowest contributors to climate change, who lack the fiscal capacity to address L&D. Returns on investing in L&D are momentarily non-existent, removing private flows from the mix. The solutions offered through a funding mechanism offers hope.

What about Climate Justice?

In her book, Climate Justice,[27] Mary Robinson points to how, globally, “raising awareness about climate justice requires us to marry the standards of human rights with issues of sustainable development and responsibility for climate change.” Loss and damage has several consequences, not least those experienced by vulnerable nations and their citizens due to shifting climate patterns and rising seas. In 2004, a Category 3 superstorm, Hurricane Ivan, struck the Caribbean Island of Grenada, causing widespread devastation. The monetary cost of the disaster was approximately 855 million USD, twice the country’s GDP. 80% of structures were destroyed, and 73 out of 75 public schools were damaged.[28]

Additionally, the impacts of hurricanes and similar large storms vary between individuals based on their socioeconomic status. A study published in 2022[29] suggested that climate change could “exacerbate social inequalities in the wake of extreme weather events, if hard-hit areas are majority-minority areas, and especially if they are low-income or otherwise socially or economically vulnerable.” Mary Robinson points to the post-Hurricane Katrina devastation that hit New Orleans in 2005, where the most affected were African Americans, many of whom had been forced during the Civil War to live in areas prone to flooding.[30] An effect of early segregation, this is not an isolated incident across areas prone to climate disasters. Addressing climate concerns in just the United States, further examples show racist housing practices and their link to hotter urban neighborhoods in certain cities[31] and how racial segregation can shape climate adaptation initiatives.[32]

Lisa Dale details how women are disproportionately affected.[33] Gender inequity exists across all nations: for example, women are more likely to die in disasters, which can be attributed to the myriad ways in which traditional gender roles create lasting vulnerabilities. Another instance is how a lower level of education often ensures that women have little to no access to timely disaster-related news that may prevent them from being exposed to immediate risks. A lower rate of formalized land tenure further ensures that women are more easily displaced than men. Then, limited access to healthcare and mental health resources put women at a disadvantage even before the disaster arrives.

Climate change will further impact the lives of indigenous peoples. For example, indigenous people of the North American Arctic, the Inuit, find themselves in the middle of a geopolitical climate change conundrum that they did not create. Their surroundings are undergoing dramatic alterations, impacting the natural landscape and the greater marine food network they have relied on for generations. Winter has now become six weeks shorter for coastal Labrador, and the ice coverage of the sea is a third lesser than a decade prior.[34]

Climate change will cause economic and non-economic losses alike. While assessing economic loss can be done through measurement over time, measuring non-economic losses will be difficult. How would one measure the impact of a death of a loved one due to climate disaster, or the loss of culture and community?

The Vanuatu International Court of Justice (ICJ) Initiative[35] is a growing coalition of nearly 80 countries requesting a non-binding Advisory Opinion from the ICJ to understand what existing international laws may be applied to current climate issues and the rights of independent countries. Legally, loss and damage relate, inter alia, to the right of access to justice, establishing responsibilities, and reparation mechanisms, including compensation. However, current geopolitics in the climate space dictate that climate change impacts will not be paid as reparations to affected states and peoples. Developed countries, during negotiations, have until now insisted that loss and damage have nothing to do with liability or compensation. The Vanuatu ICJ Initiative has the potential to open the discussion up so that liability and compensation to be paid. Given these dynamics, a Loss and Damage Fund that is adequate, additional, and fit-for-purpose may be the least controversial solution to climate justice needed to tackle climate impacts.

What’s Missing?

While a loss and damage funding arrangement is welcomed, COP27 was unable to improve on the ambition from Glasgow the previous year. The goal to keep 1.5° C alive must be shown equal importance while supporting initiatives such as the Global Goal on Adaptation.[36] At a side event at COP27, Executive Director of the UN Environment Program Inger Andersen said, “The current policies take us to a 2.8 degrees world. … It is important that we have a conversation about emissions reduction and who carries the load. The G20, which are meeting this very week ... have a collective responsibility for 75 percent of all emissions.” She later urged these economies to invest in climate finance and “climate justice.”

Finally, the fear persists around any progress around climate financing for loss and damage costing progress in due course on both mitigation and adaptation. This is concerning if funding is merely readjusted inside the 100 billion USD promised by the Paris Agreement. The call for additional funding is key. Climate vulnerable countries and communities are unable to support initiatives for loss and damage inside their limited fiscal capacities.

Conclusion

Averting, minimizing, and addressing loss and damage has reached a critical point in its delivery following the “COP of Implementation” at Sharm el-Sheikh. Enabling factors of finance, governance, and capacity of knowledge sharing must be generated for loss and damage through a mosaic of solutions for climate vulnerable countries. This may be through the establishment of the recently-agreed loss and damage funding arrangement, potentially within the UNFCCC, supported with funding from MDBs and IFIs, or through innovative financing through taxes, debt forgiveness, or technical capacity-building.

While the political will and stamina exists within developing nations to tackle climate crises, they require considerable finance and ample fiscal space to receive support to avert, minimize, and address loss and damage, especially given the existential threat climate change poses to them.

The enabling conditions of governance and knowledge are being developed through the Santiago Network, as part of the Warsaw International Mechanism. Where finance was of great concern, COP27 has delivered on the call for support from the climate vulnerable and SIDS. This call, met halfway by states of the Global North, will keep the door open for larger developing nations to contribute to a loss and damage fund in the future. In a video message at the closing of COP27, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said, “This COP has taken an important step towards justice. I welcome the decision to establish a loss and damage fund and to operationalize it in the coming period.”

2023 will be a crucial year to operationalize and answer the where, who, and what of the funding arrangement, without sacrificing ambition on mitigation and adaptation. All eyes now turn to UAE, as it prepares to host COP28.

[i] International Circus Hall of Fame described Backyard as a space that is “Off Limits to the general public. Dressing rooms, ring stock tents (padrooms), wardrobe and costume departments, doctor’s wagon, tailor’s wagon and performer’s rest areas were all located in the back yard of the railroad transported circuses.” International Circus Hall of Fame. (2023). Glossary of Circus Terminology. Peru, Indiana: International Circus Hall of Fame. Retrieved from https://circushalloffame.com/glossary-ofcircus-terminology/.

[ii] IMF-created international reserve asset

[1] Karen Gilchrist, “There’s no higher ground for us’: Maldives’ environment minister says country risks disappearing,” CNBC, May 18, 2021, from https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/19/maldives-calls-for-urgent-action-to-end-climate-change-sea-level-rise.html.

[2] Salanieta Kitolelei, Randy Thaman, Joeli Veitayaki, Annette Breckwoldt, and Susanna Piovano, “Na Vuku Makawa ni Qoli: Indigenous Fishing Knowledge (IFK) in Fiji and the Pacific,” Frontiers in Marine Science 8 (2021).

[3] Olivia Serdeczny, Eleanor Waters, and Sander Chan, “Non-Economic Loss and Damage in the Context of Climate Change,” Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, March 2016, https://climateanalytics.org/media/dp_neld_3.2016.pdf.

[4] U.S. Dept. of State, “COP27 Logistical FAQ,” https://www.state.gov/cop27-logistical-faq/.

[5] Edward A. Parson, “ COPs as Three-Ring Circus,” Legal Planet, December 17, 2021, https://legal-planet. org/2021/12/17/cops-as-three-ring-circus/.

[6] IPCC Working Group II, “IPCC Sixth Assessment Report,” IPCC, 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ ar6/wg2/.

[7] IPCC, “Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5° C,” 2022, https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/.

[8] Adelle Thomas, “Loss and damage: A moral imperative to act,” United Nations, (n.d.), https://www. un.org/en/climatechange/adelle-thomas-loss-and-damage.

[9] Christopher D. Stone, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,” The American Journal of International Law 98, no. 2 (2004): 276-301.

[10] Preety Bhandari, Nate Warszawski, Deirdre Cogan, and Rhys Gerholdt, “What Is “Loss and Damage” from Climate Change? 8 Key Questions, Answered,” World Resources Institute, December 14, 2022, https://www.wri.org/insights/loss-damage-climate-change.

[11] Loss and Damage Collaboration, “What is Loss and Damage?” (n.d.), https://www.lossanddamagecollaboration.org/whatislossanddamage.

[12] UNFCCC, “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damages,” https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/ NWPStaging/Pages/Warsaw-International-Mechanism-for-Loss-and-Damage.aspx.

[13] UNFCCC, “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damages.”

[14] UNFCCC, “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damages.”

[15] UNFCCC, “Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damages.”

[16] “Global Shield against Climate Risks, an initiative for pre-arranged financial support designed to be quickly deployed in times of climate disasters. Initial contributions include around 170 million euros from Germany and more than 40 million euros from other countries.” German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, “V20 and G7 jointly launch Global Shield against Climate Risks at COP27,” November 14, 2022, https://www.bmz.de/en/news/press-releases/v20-g7-launch-global-shield-against-cllimate-risks-at-cop27-128244.

[17] Vulnerable Group of 20, “Vulnerable Group of 20,” V20, (n.d.), https://www.v-20.org/.

[18] Carbon Brief Staff, “COP27: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Sharm el-Sheikh,” Carbon Brief, November 21, 2022, https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop27-key-outcomes-agreed-at-the-unclimate-talks-in-sharm-el-sheikh/.

[19] “Decide to establish new funding arrangements for assisting developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, in responding to loss and damage, including with a focus on addressing loss and damage by providing and assisting in mobilizing new and additional resources, and that these arrangements complement and include sources, funds, processes and initiatives under and outside the Convention and the Paris Agreement.” UNFCCC, “Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage,” November 20, 2022, https://unfccc.int/documents/624440.

[20] Cathrine Wenger, “Cop27: Considerations for a Loss & Damage Finance Facility,” Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, October 2022, https://www.c2es.org/document/cop27-considerations-for-a-lossdamage-finance-facility/.

[21] Wenger, “Cop27.”

[22] Luavit Zahid, “World Bank adaptation funds slept through Pakistan’s record flooding,” Climate Home News, January 17, 2023, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2023/01/17/world-bank-adaptationfunds-slept-through-pakistans-record-flooding/.

[23] Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, “The 2022 Bridgetown Initiative,” September 23, 2022, https://www.foreign.gov.bb/the-2022-barbados-agenda/.

[24] Michael Franczak, “Options for a Loss and Damage Financial Mechanism,” International Peace Institute, October 14, 2022, https://www.ipinst.org/2022/10/options-for-a-loss-and-damage-financial-mechanism.

[25] “The RST helps low-income and vulnerable middle-income countries build resilience to external shocks and ensure sustainable growth, contributing to their longer-term balance of payments stability. It complements the IMF’s existing lending toolkit by providing longer-term, affordable financing to address longer-term challenges, including climate change and pandemic preparedness.” International Monetary Fund, “Resilience and Sustainability Trust FAQs,” IMF, (n.d.), https://www.imf.org/ en/About/FAQ/Resilience-and-Sustainability-Trust#:~:text=The%20IMF’s%20Resilience%20and%20 Sustainability,term%20balance%20of%20payments%20stability.

[26] Franczak, “Options for a Loss and Damage Financial Mechanism.”

[27] Mary Robinson, Climate Justice (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2018).

[28] Tannecia S. Stephenson and Jhordanne J. Jones, “Impacts of Climate Change on Extreme Events in the Coastal and Marine Environments of Caribbean Small Island Developing States,” CARIBBEAN CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT CARD: SCIENCE REVIEW (2017).

[29] Kevin T. Smiley, Ilan Noy, Michael F. Wehner, Dave Frame, Christopher C. Sampson, and Oliver E. J. Wing, “Social inequalities in climate change-attributed impacts of Hurricane Harvey,” Nature Communications 13 (2022), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-022-31056-2#citeas.

[30] Robinson, Climate Justice.

[31] Meg Anderson, “Racist Housing Practices From The 1930s Linked To Hotter Neighborhoods Today,” NPR, January 14, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/14/795961381/racist-housing-practices-from-the1930s-linked-to-hotter-neighborhoods-today.

[32] Kevin Loughran and James R. Elliot, “Unequal Retreats: How Racial Segregation Shapes Climate Adaptation,” Housing Policy Debate 32, no. 1 (2022): 171-189.

[33] Lisa Dale, Climate Change Adaptation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2022).

[34] Becky Ferreira, “‘It’s Going to Change Everything’: Inuit Face a New and Worrying Climate,” Vice, September 25, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en/article/pky5n7/inuit-indigenous-climate-change-arcticnorthwest-passage.

[35] Nadia Sánchez Castillo-Winckels, “ Loss and Damage Funding and Vanuatu’s ICJ Initiative: Parallel Processes Relevant to Climate Obligations under International Law,” The Global Network for Human Rights and the Environment, January 18, 2023, https://gnhre.org/2023/01/loss-and-damage-fundingand-vanuatus-icj-initiative-parallel-processes-relevant-to-climate-obligations-under-international-law/.

[36] UNFCCC, “Funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, including a focus on addressing loss and damage.”