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Asia-Pacific

  • May 15, 2012

    Across much of the globe, the universal right of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief remains under assault. From laws restricting or abrogating this right to violent acts committed by private citizens against religious practitioners, serious violations continue to occur in many regions.

    In this article, two members of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Chairman Leonard A. Leo and Katrina Lantos Swett, focus on current violations of freedom of religion or belief in South Asia, specifically Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. From the promulgation and enforcement of blasphemy laws to the failure to bring the perpetrators of violence against religious minorities to speedy justice, the authors spotlight the problem and advocate constructive solutions. They argue that as a pivotal human right demonstrably tied to societal well-being, religious freedom must be honored and protected, not just in South Asia, but in every nation in the world.

  • Vol. 65, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2012
  • Vol. 65, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2012

    In recent years, environmental protection has increasingly been incorporated into municipal policy agendas in China. Although rising environmental awareness is an indicator of progress toward sustainable practices, a closer examination of recent policies reveals a tendency toward “spectacularization,” i.e., municipal governments actively endorsing various green initiatives to stage “spectacles” that promote their cities. This article critiques green spectacles and urges a return to the “ordinary” in urban environmental policy making, in which urban spaces would be developed based on a city’s unique needs rather than with a predetermined template. This would require abandoning costly flagship eco-city projects and top-down policy campaigns, as well as reflecting critically on what “green” means in everyday city life.

  • Vol. 65, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2012

    This article discusses issues of development in Singapore and their implications for other rapidly growing urban areas in Asia. Formerly a British colony, the multiethnic republic of Singapore has flourished in the nearly fifty years since achieving independence. The article explores Singapore’s distinctive economic and political systems and assesses official approaches to plan both its physical and sociocultural environments. It also discusses how Singapore’s foreign policy impacts the country’s role as a popular tourist destination. The city-state’s government has critics, but Singapore’s efficiency, economic successes, safety and security are impossible to deny. However, maintaining momentum and securing sustainable growth will be a challenge for policy makers in the years ahead due to new domestic and international uncertainties. While Singapore’s experiences are unique, analysis of this city-state helps illuminate both development processes at work in Asia and methods for managing such changes. Given the projected expansion of Asian metropolitan areas, dealing effectively with the problems that arise alongside urbanization is a critical task confronting authorities across much of the region.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • February 6, 2012

    At the 2005 UN World Summit, the largest gathering of heads of state in history made a landmark commitment to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and pledged to intervene when a given state manifestly failed to protect its population from mass atrocity or was the actual perpetrator of these crimes. It is unequivocal that the DPRK has violated this international norm known as the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). With hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees outside of the country, evidence of crimes against humanity and genocide taking place in North Korea is overwhelming. The DPRK is actively targeting for destruction every group which is protected under the UN Genocide Convention through its policy of killing the half-Chinese children of North Korean women forcibly repatriated by China (genocide on national, ethnical, and racial grounds) and through its systematic annihilation of its indigenous religious population and their families (genocide on religious grounds). The North Korean state is perpetrating crimes against humanity as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court through its treatment of political prisoners and its exploitative and discriminatory food policy which has been the primary cause of millions of deaths.

  • Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2011

    Myanmar has been under military rule in various guises for nearly fifty years. The most durable and unyielding of the authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia, Myanmar’s military rulers have expertly exploited circumstances and methods that prolong their rule, even as they have failed to deliver genuine economic growth and development. Their methods include ruthlessly suppressing dissent, inciting ethnic divisions and fears of external threats and making implicit bargains with neighboring states and domestic elites over the spoils available to a rentier state. Myanmar’s emergence in recent years as a significant regional supplier of natural gas has dramatically increased the country’s distributable economic rents, thus exacerbating the country’s political stasis. This article examines the ways in which Myanmar’s military regime has maintained its rule through the exploitation of these methods, but with a particular focus on the impacts of the country’s exploitable energy and resource wealth and its implications for Myanmar’s economic development and political transition.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2011

    On the heels of democratic uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), recent “mass incidents” (qunti shijian) in China have spurred renewed debate about the level of social dissatisfaction and the stability of authoritarian governance in the People’s Republic of China. Yet, unlike in Tunisia, Egypt and other countries in the MENA facing widespread rebellion against their ruling regimes, protests in China have not been directed at central political leaders or the political system as a whole. By examining the similarities and differences between Chinese and Middle Eastern authoritarianism, this article seeks to uncover which factors underpin continued public acceptance of the Chinese Communist Party and which ones—if left unchecked—bode ill for the regime.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2011

    Vietnam now participates in a capitalist market and keeps its borders open, but it still imposes a dated yet effective communist matrix of control over the country’s media outlets. This article examines the effectiveness of this system of control with respect to visual art. I find that contemporary art in particular is able to communicate—and express frustrations with—the tensions between rapid economic development and political stagnation, and between cultural traditionalism and modernization. Art can speak with relative impunity because its meaning is more difficult to pinpoint than written criticism of the regime. However, it is important to note that few, if any, Vietnamese artists advocate a change of regime. Instead, they emphasize their concerns about tensions in society caused by rapid development and its effect on centuries-old traditions. The current one-party regime certainly contributes to this tension, but it would be an oversimplification to call these artists “protest artists”; rather, they act as a lens through which both Vietnamese citizens and outsiders get an honest and unbiased view of a country that is too often thought of in terms of colonialism or war.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2011

    Today more than 500 million Chinese Internet users roam social networking websites. Of them, as many as 300 million are part of a rapidly growing microblogosphere. This article examines the predicament of companies providing social networking services inside China’s Great Firewall—specifically, the way in which they handle conflicting demands from the party-state and emerging civil society. In light of the phenomenal growth of
    microblogging and the Chinese government’s tighter control over netizens in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011, the issue of social agency comes to the fore. This article asks if the Chinese entrepreneurial class—the so-called “red capitalists”—could become agents of democratic political change. Are Internet entrepreneurs allies of civil society or the government? Based on their current esprit de corps with the state, it is unlikely that they will directly assist social change in the foreseeable future. Yet willingly or not, by providing civil society with tools to challenge the regime, they are becoming key players in the process of creating a more inclusive and accountable politics in China.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2011

    Although North Korea’s northern border remains easy to cross, and North Koreans are now well aware of the prosperity enjoyed south of the demilitarized zone, Kim Jong Il continues to rule over a stable and supportive population. Kim enjoys mass support due to his perceived success in strengthening the race and humiliating its enemies. Thanks in part to decades of skillful propaganda, North Koreans generally equate the race with their state, so that ethno-nationalism and state-loyalty are mutually enforcing. In this respect North Korea enjoys an important advantage over its rival, for in the Republic of Korea ethno-nationalism militates against support for a state that is perceived as having betrayed the race. South Koreans’ “good race, bad state” attitude is reflected in widespread sympathy for the people of the North and in ambivalent feelings toward the United States and Japan, which are regarded as friends of the republic but enemies of the race. But North Korea cannot survive forever on the public perception of state legitimacy alone. The more it loses its economic distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rival state, the more the Kim regime must compensate with triumphs on the military and nuclear fronts. Another act of aggression against the Republic of Korea may well take place in the months ahead, not only to divert North Korean public attention from the failures of the consumer-oriented “Strong and Prosperous Country” campaign, but also to strengthen the appeasement-minded South Korean opposition in the run-up to the presidential election in 2012.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 65, No. 1, Fall/Winter 2011

    On 5 December 1978, Wei Jingsheng, an electrician at the Beijing Zoo, posted an essay to a brick wall on Xidan Street called “The Fifth Modernization,” which stated:

    “Democracy is our only choice. . . . If we want to modernize our economy, sciences, military and other areas, then we must first modernize our people and our society. . . . Without democracy, society will become stagnant and economic growth will face insurmountable obstacles.”

    Wei’s rare, public appeal for democracy struck a chord with the Chinese people, who were exhausted by the failures of communism and the Cultural Revolution. The brick wall on Xidan Street was soon filled with other criticisms of the regime and became known as the “Democracy Wall.” However, the “Beijing Spring” was short lived. Wei was arrested on 29 March 1979 and imprisoned for fourteen-and-a-half years. He was released in September 1993, only to be detained again in February 1994 for engaging in political activities. He was deported to the United States in 1997 when the international community succeeded in pressuring China for his release. Having lived in exile for nearly fifteen years, Wei discussed his views of China with the Journal’s Rebecca Chao.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • November 2, 2011

    While America’s goals in the AfPak region have focused on eliminating Al Qaeda, organizations like Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba are ready to step into the breach. Yet Islamist militants will prevail in AfPak so long as America remains dependent on Pakistan for access to Central Asia; Pakistan makes use of this dependence to secure military aid, backing militants whose existence in turn ensures American engagement in the region and continued American dependence on Pakistan.

    But the main reason that Pakistan has nurtured Islamist militants is Islamabad’s insecurity over its unbalanced relationship with India. This insecurity accounts for the military’s influence over Pakistani decision-making, a role guaranteed by its pervasive control of Pakistan’s economy that began at partition. Instead of aggravating the problem with more military aid, Washington should encourage structural change (1) in the Pakistani economy, by reintegrating the region and economically undoing the partition of the subcontinent; and (2) in its relations with Pakistan by opening the Chabahar-Afghanistan route in eastern Iran, thus reducing its dependence on Pakistan.

  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    This paper investigates the threat of a water war between China and India. It argues that
    Indian suspicion of China has been premature. Beijing has not yet given its approval for
    major water diversion projects in Tibet, it has taken some limited steps toward easing the
    concerns of the Indian government and a growing number of Chinese experts have taken
    an interest in developing institutional frameworks for managing transboundary rivers.
    However, a definitive settlement or cooperation will be difficult because both countries perceive
    themselves as the victim of a greedy neighbor. While India complains about China’s
    ravenous exploitation of the Himalayan rivers, it is common in China to accuse India of
    exaggerating the Chinese threat and being unreasonable in its demands.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    The “all-weather” Sino-Pakistan relations, characterized especially by Beijing’s position
    on the Kashmir issue and its long-standing and close defense ties with Islamabad, continue
    to affect New Delhi’s threat perceptions and Sino-Indian relations. Beijing’s need to
    sustain friendly relations with Pakistan stems from its desire to mitigate ethnic separatist
    problems, improve energy security and execute its policy of hedging against a rising and
    future rival in India. Despite the changing international and regional security environments
    and Beijing’s more balanced South Asia policy, this need is viewed in New Delhi
    as a major obstacle to enhancing mutual trust and improving bilateral relations between
    China and India. Conversely, without de-hyphenating Sino-Indian ties, the Pakistan
    factor will remain a point of contention in fully developing the increasingly important
    relationship between Asia’s two rising powers.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    Tibet is a key factor in India-China relations. It is only after the 1950 Chinese occupation
    of Tibet that India and China came to share the now disputed common border. In
    recent years, China’s military buildup and infrastructure development in Tibet, as well as
    reported plans to divert or dam rivers that rise in Tibet and flow into India, have raised
    India’s anxieties. Conversely, China’s insecurity about Tibet is an important driver of its
    approach toward India. India has been unable to assuage China’s fears about its possible
    use of the presence of the Dalai Lama in India and its large Tibetan refugee population
    of about 120,000 to create trouble for China in Tibet. The presence of the Dalai Lama
    and a large community of Tibetan refugees in India has kept the “Tibetan question”
    alive. Given India’s open democratic system and long tradition of giving refuge to persecuted
    peoples, India will find it politically impossible to meet China’s expectations on
    the Tibet question without a significant quid pro quo. The breakdown of talks between
    the Chinese government and representatives of the Dalai Lama does not augur well for
    the future, and a post-Dalai Lama situation could become much more complicated. Of
    late, China’s aggressive territorial claims on India, the deepening of the China-Pakistan
    alliance and a shift in China’s position on Kashmir has led to a hardening of India’s
    position on Tibet. India is now seeking satisfaction on what it considers to be the core
    issues relating to India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. India-China relations are
    unlikely to be on an even keel until this tangled knot is unraveled.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    This article explores the strategies used by China and India, two emerging global economies,
    to build a strong relationship with Africa. It analyzes China and India’s competing
    interests and strategies around four broad issues: access to Africa’s potentially vast
    markets, development cooperation, diplomatic influence and energy security. Several questions
    are raised based on the nature, similarities, differences and impacts of Chinese and
    Indian strategies. Will these create a new dynamism in South-South relations, or lead to
    a new form of asymmetrical relations between Africa and its Asian giant friends? What
    are the likely implications of closer Sino- and Indo-African ties for the continent’s relations
    with the West, Africa’s traditional trading partner, with which it has long-established
    relations, economic and strategic interests? In seeking explanations or answers, we
    caution that the differences between Chinese and Indian strategies of engagement are more
    of form than intent, underscoring the primacy of the competing national interests that
    do not completely foreclose mutually reinforcing strategies. We note that India’s strategies
    presently swing between playing “catch up” with China—which has clearly made greater
    inroads—and pragmatically accommodating Chinese and other interests in Africa. There
    are even instances, as in the case of the Sudanese oil industry, in which Chinese and
    Indian oil companies are cooperating as partners in an oil producing consortium, despite
    competing in other African countries. While the emerging scenario is one of competition
    that is moderated to some extent by accommodation, we conclude, based on certain conditions,
    that in the medium to long term, India may turn out to be more competitive than
    China in its engagement strategies with Africa.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    Energy and climate change are two important areas in which there is much more cooperation
    than competition between China and India. After a few years of trying to outbid
    each other for oil and gas exploration and production licenses, both have found it more
    productive to bid jointly for many such contracts. Even though neither China nor India
    has agreed to limits on their emissions of greenhouse gases, both are committed to reducing
    the carbon intensity of their development, by 40 to 45 percent from 2005 levels by 2020
    for China, and 20 to 25 percent over the same time period for India. To achieve these
    goals, the two countries have launched major programs to install power plants using
    renewable energy sources and nuclear energy, and to increase the efficiency of energy use.
    It is unlikely that either China or India will agree to absolute reductions in greenhouse
    gas emissions from their present levels soon, but they may be willing to cap them at future
    levels that still permit their future per capita income to become comparable to that of
    countries in Western Europe. At the recently concluded United Nations Climate Change
    Conference in Cancun, China was strongly supportive of a continuation of the Kyoto
    Protocol for a second commitment period, but India indicated that it may be willing to
    explore other approaches suggested by the United States, the EU and small island nations.
    Though their paths to addressing climate change may begin to differ, it is highly likely
    that China and India will continue to share the same strategic goal of achieving parity
    with the West in terms of standard of living of their populations, even if it means higher
    emissions for another decade or two.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    It is now a part of conventional wisdom that both China and India are emerging economic,
    political and even military powers in the 21st century. Terms such as “BRIC” and
    “Chindia,” and phrases such as “not China or India, but China and India” have entered
    popular discourse and policy discussions. Such terms imply a synergistic relationship
    between China and India—an implication that belies the tension that has characterized
    Sino-Indian relations for centuries. My view is less sanguine than many others’ about
    the prospects of their relations. Relations between the two countries will be fraught with
    difficulties and will likely remain fragile. Conflict and competitiveness are deeply rooted in
    historical and structural causes, while forces for harmony are more contingent on political
    will, cultural understanding and careful policy management. There are several areas in
    which their relations can go wrong. At a fundamental level, the two countries are in an
    economically competitive, not a complementary, relationship with each other. Their economic
    and social endowments are similar (as compared with China/U.S. or India/U.S.).
    India and China offer very different lessons about economic policies and growth. This
    is not to suggest that the two countries are headed toward an inevitable collision, but
    to identify the urgency of carefully managing their relations and nurturing trust and
    goodwill on both sides.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    The recent and growing technology trade among India, China and the rest of the world
    is punctuated with distinctive trajectories and dynamics. Propelled by the simultaneous
    phenomena of impressive economic growth and increasing technological capabilities, the
    two countries under review have made a paradigmatic shift from being predominantly
    technology-importing countries in the 1980s to technology-exporting countries at the
    beginning of the 21st century. The consequent outcome of this process is the changing
    composition of technology exports wherein the share of technology-intensive products is
    increasing in their overall export baskets, which is a clear indication of the two countries’
    growing technological prowess. A key element in this growth is that the technology
    component in the overall bilateral trade between India and China is increasing both in
    volume and diversification. A considerable part of China’s exports to India constitute
    technology-intensive products, but primary goods dominate Indian exports to China,
    revealing China’s edge over India. This is likely to change as India strengthens its comparative
    advantage in software and begins to catch up with China in sectors such as
    manufacturing. These developments have several implications not only for their economies,
    but also for those in both developed and developing countries.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    Despite close geographical proximity and centuries-old ties, the relationship between
    China and India has been filled with obstacles and stumbling blocks. The majority of
    academic research and media reports tend to examine relations at the national level, yet
    cities have become increasingly important due to urbanization and globalization. This
    paper argues that, through the city platform, India and China can turn potential cooperation
    into reality. The differences between Chinese and Indian cities beget complementarity
    that provides great potential for cooperation. Local governments in both China and India
    have high levels of administrative power in decisionmaking. Cooperation between cities
    can avoid many obstacles that prevail in national-level cooperation. Local governments
    will not only be motivated to cooperate, but also can accomplish a great deal in promoting
    cooperation between the two countries. The conditions for city cooperation are improving.
    Cities can and should become a key path and a new engine for Sino-Indian cooperation.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    Submerged tensions between India and China have pushed to the surface, revealing a
    deep and wide strategic rivalry over several security-related issues in the Asia-Pacific
    area. The U.S.-India nuclear deal and regular joint naval exercises informed Beijing’s
    assessment that U.S.-India friendship was aimed at containing China’s rise. China’s
    more aggressive claims to the disputed northern border—a new challenge to India’s sovereignty
    over Kashmir—and the entry of Chinese troops and construction workers in the
    disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region escalated the conflict. India’s reassessment of China’s
    intentions led the Indian military to adopt a two-front war doctrine against potential
    simultaneous attacks by Pakistan and China. China’s rivalry with India in the Indian
    Ocean area is also displacing New Delhi’s influence in neighboring countries. As China’s
    growing strength creates uneasiness in the region, India’s balancing role is welcome within
    ASEAN. Its naval presence facilitates comprehensive cooperation with other countries
    having tense relations with China, most notably Japan. India’s efforts to outflank China’s
    encirclement were boosted after Beijing unexpectedly challenged U.S. naval supremacy
    in the South China Sea and the Pacific. The Obama Administration reasserted the big
    picture strategic vision of U.S.-India partnership first advanced by the nuclear deal.
    Rivalry between China and India in the Indian Ocean, now expanded to China and
    the United States in the Pacific, is solidifying an informal coalition of democracies in the
    vast Asia-Pacific area.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    “The world has enough for both of us” has come to be a regular refrain of Chinese and
    Indian leaders. Even academic commentaries sometimes use this argument to explain
    why Asia’s two fastest growing economies and increasingly dynamic billion-plus-strong
    societies will not clash as they pursue peaceful development. Their relationship continues
    to be examined in simplistic dichotomies of competition or cooperation, rivals or partners,
    friends or foes, etc., ignoring the complex nature of their evolution and interactions. This
    paper argues that their continued rapid economic growth and resultant ever-expanding
    engagement with the external world is not completely innocent, and that their growth has
    begun to influence their bilateral relations. Prima facie, multilateral forums provide
    China and India with a relatively neutral playground in which the two countries have
    gradually begun to decipher their stronger commonality of interests in addressing their
    regional/global challenges within multilateral settings. This expanding mutual trust and
    understanding at the multilateral level is expected to have a positive impact on the nature
    of their historically complicated bilateral equations. No doubt, their difficult bilateral
    engagement also impacts their interactions at the multilateral level and their mutual
    trust deficit circumscribes their joint strategies in multilateral forums. Yet, on balance,
    contemporary Sino-Indian relations seem to mark a clear shift in the center of gravity from
    a bilateral to a multilateral matrix. This shift is now discernible enough to stand scrutiny
    and also to guide the future direction of Sino-Indian equations.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    China and India remain locked in a stagnant embrace when it comes to the most intractable
    of security dilemmas: the Sino-Indian border issue. A closer look at Chinese and
    Indian strategic, scientific and academic experts’ security perceptions vis-à-vis one another
    reveals that there is much more to the Sino-Indian security dynamic than meets the eye.
    Chinese and Indian strategic analysts hold divergent interests when evaluating each
    other’s military modernization, the former preoccupied with India’s naval development
    and the latter with China’s army. Technical analysts in each country share a similar level
    of interest in the other’s aviation and aerospace programs. Scholars exhibit a strong, if not
    symmetrical, level of focus on the other country’s nuclear strategy and status. Using this
    tripartite discourse as a baseline, this essay provides both a quantitative and qualitative
    analysis of each group’s perceptions to better understand Sino-Indian security relations
    and to propose measures within each arena to enhance mutual understanding. It shows
    that the Sino-Indian security dilemma cannot be simply viewed through the prism of the
    border anymore.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    Seventeen years after publishing “India: A New Tiger on the Block?” in the Spring/
    Summer 1994 issue of the Journal of International Affairs, Arvind Panagariya revisits
    his analysis of India’s 1991 economic reforms and looks ahead to India’s economic prospects
    in a changing world order.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    China and India have had an often turbulent relationship. At the state level, strategic
    and diplomatic relations between the two are fraught with complications, tensions and
    misgivings that many observers believe are destined to continue for the foreseeable future.
    The purpose of this paper is to detail the various opportunities for cooperation that stem
    from the common challenges that China and India face as they continue to develop into
    major global powers. We argue that the key to successful cooperation will not occur at the
    intergovernmental level; rather, it will be based upon the building of social and cultural
    bridges between the Chinese and Indian people.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
  • Vol. 64, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2011

    In an interview with José Vericat of the Journal of International Affairs, Kishore Mahbubani, dean and professor in the practice of public policy at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, situates Sino-Indian relations in historical context, explains the U.S.-China-India balancing act and assures us that the rise of two somewhat acrimonious giants is not all bad news.

    Keywords: Asia-Pacific
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